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ABSTRACT 
 
Fragmented Authoritarianism and 
Politics of Hydropower in China -- Case Studies of TGP & NRP 
 
by 
WONG Miu Fai Tommy 
Master of Philosophy  
Thanks for economic improvements since the ‘open-door policy’ in 1978; 
China’s international status has been improving economically and even politically. For 
instance, she has become a major contributor of BRIC which is a group of four most 
rapidly developing countries in the world, i.e. Brazil, Russia, India and China, and the 
largest buyer of U.S. treasury bonds in the world. Nevertheless, a number of intellectuals 
like Liu and Shirk pointed out that there are still a number of difficulties – both 
exogenous and endogenous – underneath.1 This research would like to concentrate on 
one of the aspects which Chinese investigators frequently highlighted: the hydropower 
development. 
This thesis will concentrate on the most controversial dam construction projects 
in China – Three Gorges Project in central China and the Nu River Project in Yunnan 
(hereafter abbreviate as ‘TGP’ and ‘NRP’ respectively) to examine the roles, influences 
and linkages of several critical actors in midst of decision-making processes – i.e. central 
leadership, provincial governments and the civil society in diverse perspectives. By 
utilizing the model of ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ (hereafter abbreviate as ‘FA’) 
suggested by Kenneth Lieberthal, I argue that the central leadership is still the most 
critical stakeholder who determines the success or failure of mega hydropower 
development projects albeit the increasing decentralization and rapid emergence of 
environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the recent decades after 
economic liberalization of China.  
Besides, the thesis would sketch out the tactics of participating and negotiations 
in the policy making processes of local leaders and social organizations and explain the 
apparent deliberation for hydropower development of the central authorities and the 
abilities of social organizations to halt dam constructions in the latest NRP in spite of 
being the most deterministic stakeholder in the polity. In the end, I would summarize 
general findings and enrich the FA model to facilitate the predictability of the model 
after social and economic changes associated with economic reforms.   
                                                             
1Liu Guiping, “China still needs to be low profile (Zhongguo reng xu taoguang yanghui),” The United 
Morning Post (Lianhe Zaobao), 7 Nov, 2009, p. 26; Also see Susan L. Shirk. China – Fragile Power. U.S.A: 
Oxford University Press, 2007 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Rapid economic development in China has drawn the worldwide attention. In the 
recent financial tsunami and previous financial turmoil in the late 1997, she also has 
played an outstanding and dynamic role in the global economy. Yet, the economically 
prosperous surface could not fully cover a series of socio-political problems. 
Intellectuals and commentators -- both from overseas and domestic – have expressed 
their concerns of China‘s prospects. Thanks to economic improvement since the ‗open-
door policy‘ in 1978; China‘s international status has been improving economically and 
even politically. For instance, she has become a major contributor of BRIC, which is a 
group of four largest developing countries in the world, i.e. Brazil, Russia, India and 
China, and has been the largest buyer of U.S. treasury bonds in the world. Nevertheless, 
a number of intellectuals like Liu and Shirk have pointed out that there are still a number 
of difficulties – both exogenous and endogenous – underneath.1 Shirk even described 
that China as aggressive and autocratic when it dealt with well-publicized domestic 
issues that threaten the regime
2
. This research would like to concentrate on one of the 
issues which Chinese investigators frequently highlighted: the hydropower development. 
 With hydropower development, China is the top developer amongst developing 
countries in the world. Implementing the advanced principle of Resettlement with 
Development (RwD, also known as Developmental Resettlement, Development-oriented 
Resettlement, etc.) in dam construction project enables China to gain admiration from 
the World Bank
3
. Hence, numerous developing countries have followed the Chinese 
                                                             
1Liu Guiping, “China still needs to be low profile (Zhongguo reng xu taoguang yanghui),” The United 
Morning Post (Lianhe Zaobao), 7 Nov, 2009, p. 26; Also see Susan L. Shirk. China – Fragile Power. U.S.A: 
Oxford University Press, 2007 
2
 Shirk, 2007: 11. 
3Brooke McDonald, Michael Webber & Duan Yuefang, “Involuntary Resettlement as an Opportunity for 
Development: The Case of Urban Resettlers of the Three Gorges Project, China,” Journal of Refugee 
Studies 21, no. 1 (2008): 83 &86. Tan pointed out that the World Bank had examined the Shuikou 
Project and claimed it as ‘the best-practice example of properly planned and executed involuntary 
  2 
model as bailout of poverty, such as Nepal and Congo, etc
4
. In the mindset of elites from 
developing countries, huge dams represent the modernization and technological 
advancement or improvement of the countries. It is believed that the quicker dams are 
being constructed, the larger and faster the revenue from generating hydroelectricity 
realized
5
.  Despite rising opposing voice to the construction of dam in the world, there is 
still a perception that dam-building is a necessary construction of infrastructure for an 
economy to develop
6
. Subsequently, developing countries are eager to construct 
thousands of dams in their territories in the fastest pace
7
. McDonald and her fellow 
authors pointed out that Chinese dam builders had been involved into over 90 projects 
globally and these projects are built in diverse developing countries in accordance with 
Chinese model of dam construction
8
. Thus, the in-depth analysis in Chinese hydropower 
projects could have strong predictability in the development of these facets in other 
developing countries. 
 On the other hand, further economic growth and material prosperity of the 
society is still an essential strategy for the development of China. Particularly this 
concept is explained as the major channel for the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter as 
the party or CCP) to consolidate the legitimacy of its administration
9
. In addition, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
resettlement in the world.  See: Yan Tan,  Resettlement in the Three Gorges Project (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2008), 31 
4Peter Bosshard, “Three Gorges Dam – Still China’s Model for the World?” [Internet] (Accessed 16 July 
2009), (International Rivers, 5 July 2009); available from 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/blog/peter-bosshard/three-gorges-dam-%E2%80%93-still-
china%E2%80%99s-model-world . 
5
 Brian Richter, ‘Damming the Yangtze: Are a Few Big Hydropower Projects Better than a Lot of Small 
Ones?’, Scientific American, [Internet] (accessed from 10 Nov, 2009) ,available from 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=damming-the-yangtze (13 Oct, 2009) 
6Thayer Scudder, The Future of Large Dams – Dealing with Social, environmental, Institutional and 
Political Costs (London: Earthscan, 2006), 2 
7
 Richter, 2009 
8Kristen McDonald, Peter Bosshard & Nicole Brewer, “Exporting Dams: China’s Hydropower Industry 
Goes Global”, Journal of Environmental Management 90 (2009): S294-S302. 
9
“The Issue of Challenges to the Legitimacy of CCP Rule” André Laliberté & Marc Lanteigne eds. (London: 
Routledge, 2008), 8-10 
  3 
central government actively implemented fiscal policies to stimulate domestic 
consumption after the financial tsunami, so the demand for energy in China is 
anticipated to skyrocket. In the 11
th
 Five-Year-Plan, diversifying the origins of fossil 
fuels and renewable energy dominated the lengthy content
10
. Thus, energy development 
in China becomes an important issue for China studies, especially its hydropower 
development. Unfortunately, the existing research has concentrated on the ‗going-out‘ 
strategy of the Chinese government and state-owned petroleum enterprises. Although 
there are increasing literatures trying to extend to the development of renewable energy, 
research about Chinese hydropower development still forms in a low proportion. Thus, 
how the transformation of political and administrative contexts since the economic 
reforms influences the hydro-electricity development in China is a key question for 
those who would like to investigate the circumstances behind the China‘s skyrocketing 
economic betterment.  
 Besides, when a gigantic project – no matter its scale – is on the track, thousands 
of people will be affected in resettlement, construction, planning and beneficiary. Thus, 
the making-decision process of projects reflects not only the effectiveness of a 
government policy, but also influences thousands of, or even millions of people, 
enterprises and other social actors. It is, thus, of vital importance for understanding how 
the authorities mobilized and managed the dam construction and how various social 
actors expressed their opinions for the projects. Hence, giant projects essentially are no 
longer mere economic policies, but also reflect the power and distribution competition 
                                                             
10
Xinhua News Agency, CPC Proposal Urges Energy Development [Internet] , 19 October 2005, (accessed 
30 November, 2009); available from http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/guideline/157456.htm  
  4 
among authorities and various stakeholders, so they are indeed arenas of political 
contest
11
.  
 This thesis will concentrate on the two most controversial dam construction 
projects in China – Three Gorges Project in central China and the Nu River Project in 
Yunnan (hereafter abbreviated as ‗TGP‘ and ‗NRP‘ respectively) to examine the roles, 
influences and linkages of several critical actors – i.e. central leadership, provincial 
governments and the civil society in diverse perspectives. This enables us to have a more 
comprehensive and concentrated view of totally different consequences of both projects. 
In addition, this study reveals the constraints of the central leadership to implement the 
next step of its economic development strategy, other than relying on bare analyses 
about central-peripheral relationship or state-society relationship in China. Graph 1-1 
shows the dimensions of research in this thesis. Amongst all social actors in the projects, 
the central government, local governments and officials and the civil society are selected 
to be the ‗apexes‘ of research and reviews. Reciprocal interactions among these three 
actors would be discussed and analyzed. Conventionally, the central government was 
viewed as the paramount power and authority, in particular in the classical Leninist 
political system. Besides, local governments and the civil society are also the emergent 
actors in the decision-making process since economic liberalization in 1978. The 
leverages of mass media and international NGOs are also examined in this research. 
Nevertheless, they seem not to be as significant as individual actors in the decision 
making process. Subsequently, they would be discussed collaboratively with the civil 
society in the chapter 5. Apart from the interactions between these three main actors (via 
mass media and international NGOs as secondary players), this research will also 
explain the bargaining knots of various actors. These bargaining knots reflected their 
                                                             
11
Ranjit Dwivedi, Conflict and Collective Action – The Sardar Sarovar Project in India (London: Routledge, 
2006): 9-34.  
  5 
perceptions of their own interests or roles in the process. The word ‗knots‘ is used 
because bargaining apexes in this triangular relationship did not just include individual 
units or organs, but a cluster of units or organs which have similar characteristics or 
missions, although there might be a specific organ or unit ascendant in the cluster
12
. 
Graph 1-1 – Diagram of Research Dimensions 
Source: Author‘s interpretation 
By utilizing the model of ‗Fragmented Authoritarianism‘ (hereafter abbreviated 
as ‗FA‘) suggested by Kenneth Lieberthal to investigate the decision-making processes 
of TGP and NRP, this thesis would like to tackle the following questions: Who were the 
major actors in the decision-making process of these two projects? How did these actors 
anticipate / exercise their own roles and the others‘ in the projects? How did they deal 
with each other to fulfill their roles? How these two projects were applied to suit or 
                                                             
12
 Kenneth Lieberthal, Introduction: The “Fragmented Authoritarianism” Model and Its Limitations, in 
Kenneth Lieberthal & David Lampton eds. Bureaucracy, Politics , and Decision Making in Post-Mao China 
(U.S.A.: University of California Press, 1992) 
  6 
improve the FA model? And eventually, how does political administrative reform in 
China contribute to the development of hydropower in China? In order to address these 
questions, data aim to construct arguments in the dissertation are collected from a wide 
range of Chinese or English literature, including scholarly journal articles, books related 
to Chinese bureaucracy or hydropower in China or other developing countries; and news 
articles accessed from either internet or credible posts in the world, such as the New 
York Times, Washington Post, etc
13
. In addition, the research will be conducted in the 
qualitative historical and comparative approach with the case studies of the Three 
Gorges Project and Nu River Project. The literature about their construction would be 
analyzed, using the theoretical framework of FA model. 
 In the past, researches about central-peripheral relationships concentrated on the 
correlation of decentralization and economic reform via either particular economic 
indicators, such as fiscal flows, capital flows, etc; or the development in the coastal 
region
14
. However, findings from these two approaches could not be adapted to the 
inward shift in the focus of development in the 21
st
 century. Additionally, these 
approaches could not deal with the cross-provincial and cross-agencies‘ nature of dam 
construction. The details of decentralization would be discussed in the following section.  
                                                             
13 The limitations of collecting data from reviewing literature should be mentioned herein. Due to the 
launch of ‘guiding public opinion’ campaign of the CCP during the decision making period of the TGP 
and the prohibition of entering reservoir areas of the Three Gorges Dam to conduct academic 
research, according to the Chinese Laws, data provided by Chinese literature was biased and 
unreliable, especially those related to TGP. Besides, because a number of unregistered ENGOs who 
have contributed a lot of efforts in suspending the NRP relied on internet and blogs to issue news and 
information, the reliability of data was in a certain degree questioned. Thus, English literature will 
share a greater proportion of reference so as to maintain the reliability of data.  
14 For example, in the book edited by David Goodman and published in 1997 by Routledge, Hainan, 
Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai and Zhejiang were chosen to be investigated; besides, Guangdong, 
Anhui, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Tianjin and Jiangxi in the books edited by Kendrischke and Feng and 
Fitzgerald respectively. See: David Goodman ed. China’s Provinces in Reform – Class, Community and 
Political Culture (London: Routhledge, 1997); Hans Hendrischke & Feng Chongyi eds. The Political 
Economy of China’s Provinces (London: Routledge, 1999) 
  7 
 Unfortunately, the project-based research, or more precisely, having the research 
concentrating on and contrasting precisely two projects, might be argued to have limited 
applications for other aspects beyond the hydropower industry. In addition, the selection 
of specific couple of projects might be argued to degrade the ‗representativeness‘ of the 
thesis. However, they are selected amongst a variety of dam construction projects in 
China because of their uniqueness and high representativeness. These two projects 
characterize the two critical stages of transformation of policy making in contemporary 
China. The determination of enforcing the TGP reflected features of transformation in 
policy making around the June-Fourth massacre in 1989. The unprecedented large scale 
of construction and resettlement in the project is the reason why the project drew the 
worldwide controversy, other than the autocratic stance of the central authority. Despite 
the centre‘s autocracy, the bargaining postures of ministries and provinces could not 
thereby be ruled out. On the other hand, the NRP, to some extent, is less renowned, but 
this does not mean that it is less disputable and important. The fierce controversy was 
amplified by active lobbying of ENGOs (Environmental Non-Governmental 
Organizations), INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) and the mass 
media‘s cooperation. This indicates the emergence of other actors beyond the party state 
in contemporary China. Besides, the procedures of policy formulation of NRP are 
different from that of the TGP. In investigating in and contrasting these projects, it is not 
difficult to discover that the central leadership, provincial governments and NGOs had 
frequent interactions and influences to each other. Nonetheless, other projects, such as 
Sanmenxia Project in Yellow River and the Mekong River Project, which provoked 
equally high controversies might incur diplomatic variances. For instance, the 
Sanxiamen Project was largely influenced to the development of Sino-Soviet intimacy in 
the 1950s and the Mekong Project was suspended since the littoral countries in S.E. Asia, 
  8 
like Vietnam, Thailand and Laos, opposed to the project jointly. This research aims to 
study the leverages of political transformation and the development of domestic hydro-
politics in China, so diplomatic variance should be effectively eliminated. Thus, the 
cases of TGP and NRP were picked for study to have a deeper and more comprehensive 
understanding of hydroelectricity development in China. From these two projects, we 
could further understand the constraints of China to develop its interior region as well as 
its hydropower potential. The implications of findings in this research for other projects, 
or even in other energy policies, should depend on other follow-up researches. 
“Fragmented Authoritarianism” model and Chinese bureaucratic 
transformation 
Table 1-2 – Type of Centre-Province Linkages and Directions of Flow 
 Pre-reform Period Reform Period 
Centre 
(Up-Down)  
 Ideological introduction 
 Coercion 
 Command Approach 
 Patron-Client relations 
 Mass Mobilization 
 Conflict Nationalization 
 Control over leadership 
selection 
 Control over interest 
articulation 
 Merit-based recruitment 
 Interest re-distribution 
 Conflict Localization 
Provinces 
(Bottom-
up) 
Administrativ
e 
Political Administrative Political 
 Policy 
Implementa
tion 
 Communica
tions 
 
 Pleading 
 Persuasion 
 Patron-
client 
relations 
 Policy 
Implementat
ion 
 Communicat
ions 
 Support 
 Propositions 
 Opposition 
  9 
Source: Cited from Table 3.1 in Zheng, 1995, 86 
With reference to the history of the PRC since its establishment, the process of 
Chinese bureaucratic system transforming could basically be delineated into two periods 
with the death of Mao. Features of bureaucratic system were shown on Table 1-2. The 
bureaucratic system in China was generally perceived as totalitarian model during the 
Mao‘s period and the system could be summarized as the following features: mighty 
central leadership, ideological mobilization, high conformity of localities, and nation-
wide unitary, as well as comprehensive involvement of the central government.  In this 
period, the central leadership actively involved itself in, and even dominated, the 
decision-making process and local governments were just its agents in following central 
commands with absolute conformity. Central commands would be legitimatized, 
justified and promoted ideologically. Authorities and people were mobilized to actualize 
the visions promoted in the ideologies without allowing any opposition
15
. For instance, 
‗Taking steel as the key link‘ (yi gang wei gang) and ‗Surpass the UK and overwhelm 
the US‘ (chao ying gan mei)16 were major slogans and ideologies promoted in the period 
of Great Leap Forward.  Localities and individuals subsequently committed themselves 
to exploiting steel resources and heavy industries for radical industrialization. 
The death of Mao means the PRC has entered a new era of economic 
development, as well as political transformation. The central leadership under Deng‘s 
instruction mobilized provincial governments to develop a new economic role to achieve 
high economic growth
17
. Additionally, through decentralization and empowerment of 
provincial governments, the provincial leaders would have greater autonomy to develop 
                                                             
15David Goodman, ‘The Politics of Regionalism: Economic Development, Conflict and Negotiation’ in 
David Goodman and Gerald Segal eds. China Deconstructs – Politics, Trader and Regionalism (London: 
Routhledge, 1994), 7-8;  Yang Zhong, Local Government and Politics in China – Challenges from Below 
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 5-6. 
16
Translated by author 
17
 Janice L. Caulfield, ‘Local Government Reform in China: a Rational Actor Perspective’, International 
Review of Administrative Sciences 72, no.2 (2006):254-255. 
  10 
domestic economies. Consequently, there would be more interest clashes for provincial 
leaders to follow central instructions while fighting to maximize interests of provinces 
with regards to policies that reinforce economic growth
18
. Subsequently, it was generally 
agreed that the hierarchy had been pluralized and fractionalized. In her article, Caulfield 
summarized a series of decentralization reforms into three dimensions. They are: 
marketization, fiscal reforms and management and administrative reforms
19
. In essence, 
these decentralization reforms on the one hand could canvass support for economic 
reform from provincial leaders, while on the other hand, they could empower provincial 
governments to formulate tailor-made strategies for economic development
20
. 
Nevertheless, Oksenberg sketched out the structure of the contemporary Chinese 
hierarchy and agreed that in spite of it being more fragmented, the core of hierarchy is 
still under the Soviet-Leninist style
21
. Thus, he concluded that no transformation has 
occurred systematically and the leadership might not have comprehensive planning and 
dimension for political reforms
22
. The philosophy of ‗crossing the river by touching 
stones‘ is not only suitable for illustrating economic reform, but also political 
transformation as well
23
. 
Although decentralization contributed to the anxiety of political disintegration 
and the emergence of provincial protectionism, the necessity of decentralization for 
economic development could not be refuted
24
. Decentralization brings space for local 
governments to have a more prominent role in policy making processes than before. 
                                                             
18
 John Donaldson, ‘Provinces: Paradoxical Politics, Problematic Partners’ in Chung Jae Ho & Lam Tao-
Chiu eds. China’s Local Administration – Traditions and Changes in the Sub-national Hierarchy (London: 
Routledge, 2009):27. 
19 Caulfield, 2006: 258. 
20 Donaldson, 2009: 27. 
21
Michel Oksenberg, ‘China’s Political System: Challenges of Twenty-First Century’, The China Journal, 
no.45 (January 2001), 25. 
22
 Ibid, 28. 
23
 Ibid, 35. 
24Yang, 2003, 4-5 
  11 
Pessimists have argued that economic decentralization would prompt the centrifugalism 
of provinces, in particular in the 1980s, since provincial cadres committed themselves to 
develop their paddocks for self-sufficiency and imposed protectionist measures on inter-
provincial trade. Each province acted like an individual actor and neglected the central 
authority. This phenomenon was known as ‗dukedom economies‘ or ‗provincialism‘25. 
There was doubt that China might follow the path of USSR in going to collapse and 
separation
26
. However, Goodman criticized the intellectual weaknesses of the causation 
of economic decentralization and political disintegration. He countered with historical-
comparative approach and pointed out that the ethnic diffusion in China was much more 
‗homogenous‘ than Soviet Union. Furthermore, the most critical point is that the central 
leadership would still be holding the leading role in economic development, rather than 
the provincial cadres, despite power delegation
27
. As a consequence, the causation of 
economic decentralization and political disintegration are logically weak.  
The FA model is one of the models to illustrate the segmentation of authority in 
accordance with the functions of administrative organs and was proposed for explaining 
how economic policies are influenced by the bureaucratic structures of the Chinese 
government, rather than other issues. It illustrated the complexity of bureaucratic system 
of China in the 1980s and pointed out that economic decentralization fundamentally 
changed the bureaucratic system of China. The model claimed that negotiations among 
organs acted significantly in policy making. After the enrichment from Mertha, the FA 
model portrayed the triangular relationship between the central leadership, the provincial 
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bureaucratic units as well as the civil society, and explained how this triangular 
relationship influences economic policies.  
 Prior to his writing in 1992 in which he modified his thesis on the fragmentation 
of the Chinese bureaucracy, Kenneth Lieberthal, with Michel Oksenberg, combined the 
rationality model and the power model to analyze the segmentation in the central 
leadership. Besides, Lieberthal extended the scope of his pluralism arguments to lower 
hierarchal levels. He argued that ‗authority below the very peak of the Chinese political 
system is fragmented and disjointed‘.28 The model asserted that authorities are divided 
into several ‗clusters‘ based on their policy interests and modified the extent of 
segmentation of the authority. To achieve or retain their policy interests becomes the 
dynamics of officials expressing their opinions and stances. Thus, consensus seeking 
amongst ministries and commissions is the central process or core rationale in the 
decision making of China
29
. He claimed that clusters of governmental organs could be 
classified into vertical lines (tiao) and horizontal lines (kuai) of hierarchy. Vertically, 
organs would gather with similar functions and jobs; horizontally, on the contrary, they 
would perceive others at the same level but with different functions in a sort of non-
binding ‗professional relationship‘30. In effect, the economic reform and decentralization 
stressed horizontal line of authority rather than vertical line, which was described as 
‗ making tiao serve kuai‘ in Chinese31. Under this backdrop, decisions were achieved by 
‗an enormous amount of discussion and bargaining among officials to bring the right 
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people on board.
32‘ Lieberthal further pointed out that the fragmented authoritarianism 
would provide more opportunities for actors to thwart important policies from adoption 
and enforcement
33
.  
 In the model, bureaucratic units and localities are important actors. The structural 
and functional divisions of authority among bureaucracies are critical elements. In 
additional to the influence of the ranking system of the bureaucracy, it leads to the 
inevitability of seeking consensus and achieving agreement among different ‗clusters‘ of 
ministries
34
. The model pointed out that the bargaining which incurred in the consensus-
seeking process could influence the formulation and implementation of policy, as well as 
the effectiveness of the policy
35
. This is the trend of the authority of provincial 
governments having expanded. Their de facto authority was even discovered to be much 
greater than what are authorized in the constitution
36
. For example, J.S.Migdal stressed 
that 
‗the state‘s capacity to develop the economy depends 
not only on the will and skills of the top leadership, 
but also on the lower level governments and state 
organizations……[W]ithout the cooperation of low 
level governments, the state leaders could hardly get 
their job done or ―get people in the society to do what 
they want to do‘.37 
Besides, whether the relationships of units are symmetric and units‘ orientations in the 
bureaucracy would influence their behaviors and activities in amplifying their interests
38
. 
It is not difficult to discover that the market orientation of liberal economics has 
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penetrated in the polity. Thus, the FA argued that ministers and organizations lobby and 
amplify their interest and power on the basis of market-oriented-rational analysis
39
.  
 Notwithstanding the segmented nature of the bureaucracy, the authority of 
central leadership, which is still one of critical actors in the model, could not be 
underestimated. With reference to Lieberthal‘s explanation, the responsibility of the 
central leadership is to resolve any contests existing in the lengthy negotiations and 
discussions. Lieberthal and Oksenberg emphasized that the authority of central 
leadership is of vital importance and claimed that 
‗policy is the aggregate response of leaders or factions 
to problems they perceive and this response reflect the 
relative power of the participants, their strategies for 
advancing their beliefs and political interests, and 
their differentiated understanding of the problem at 
hand‘40. 
 
Besides, the central leadership also possessed the right of framing normative principles 
of policies, so ideologies and slogans were widely used to facilitate the transfer of 
wisdoms and visions of the central leadership to the lower level and to enhance the 
centre‘s coordination41. When a policy was decided to be implemented, the lower-level 
agencies in the hierarchical system would be responsible for implementing the decisions 
of the centre and cooperating with others. Conversely, the reforms contributed to the 
declining utilization of ideologies and the elimination of the centre‘s power in providing 
normative motivations
42
. On the other hand, the strong influences of central leadership 
do not mean that the current leadership could have totalitarian authority that their 
famous predecessors like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping possessed. Due to the 
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economic liberalization, the personal charisma and dictatorship would no longer be 
effective to direct the bureaucracy or implementing the policy. The leadership is less 
personalized and the power is less centralized than before. However, the central 
government is still powerful because it directs the general blueprint and dimension of 
economic reforms. Besides, the central government would also act as capital and 
information providers. The specific arrangements had been left to provincial 
governments so as to adapt the diverse situations among provinces
43
. In the cases of 
TGP and NRP, it is not difficult to discover that how the central leadership valued or 
gave priorities to a project is a vital element in determining its success or failure. 
Further, Lieberthal highlighted the difficulties of possessing actual and practical 
local information for the centre in this massive and segmented authoritarian system
44
. It 
provided ample room for intermediate organs, i.e. provincial governments, to expand 
their leverage in the policy making process. These would most likely accelerate the 
bureaucratic flaws beyond the central level
45
. Thus, the decision making process in 
China becomes more complicated and fragmented.  
To have a short sum up, Lieberthal suggested the FA model to modify and 
portray the circumstances of the policy making process in China, highlighting the top-
down approach. While affirming the mightiness of the central leadership, the FA model 
revealed a number of limitations that the central leadership encountered and flaws in the 
Chinese bureaucratic system. Unfortunately, the contentions of Lieberthal were based on 
his observations and insight into the initial stages of economic reform. Therefore, the 
continuing applicability of the FA model was questioned and there was a need to explain 
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and illustrate the status quo after further and deeper decentralization and administrative 
reforms in the late 1990s. This was in addition to the successful personnel succession in 
the 9
th
 and 10
th
 National People‘s Congress in 1998 and 2003 respectively. Alternatively, 
Lieberthal‘s suggestion was criticized as being unable to explain the dynamics of 
political transformation in the fragmented bureaucratic system. Subsequently, the 
contribution of the FA model seems to be limited to illustrating the situations, but its 
explicability seems to be limited
46
. For instance, Mertha criticized Lieberthal‘s model as 
failing to explain the larger policy, such as the ‗Open up the West‘ Campaign, seeing 
that it seemed to be ‗obsolescen[t]‘47. Critics argued that the FA model could only 
explain the features of a stage of administrative evolution since the economic reform and 
the evolution has been entering into another stage, which Lema and Ruby have 
portrayed the new stage as a stage of ‗policy coordination‘. Contrary to Lieberthal‘s 
argument, they presumed that the current policy making in China should have developed 
an underlying consensus amongst ministers which differs from the anarchy-liked 
incremental phase
48
. Unfortunately, they failed to modify the characteristics of policy 
making in the stage of policy coordination. If their arguments were deeply analyzed, 
they could only revise the FA model, but could not refute it. Then, their delineation of 
stages in policy coordination and fragmented authoritarianism is not significant because 
the major difference is the degree of power and resources competitions among agencies. 
Moreover, the existence of consensus is due to the involvement and directional guidance 
from the centre. The role of centre as the coordinator who balances and buffers the 
interests of competing agencies had already been mentioned in the article written by 
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Lieberthal several years before
49
. As a consequence, their contribution did not contradict 
against the FA model, but have enriched the arguments of Lieberthal. The FA model 
seems to be qualified to describe the bureaucratic system of China. 
Mertha’s addition and modification 
 In order to deal with Lieberthal‘s limitations, Mertha enriched the content of the 
FA model with the aid of notions of ‗policy entrepreneurship‘ and ‗coalitions‘. Although 
these two notions mainly referred to the backdrop of democratic systems, Mertha 
claimed that the context of fragmented authoritarianism had been able to ‗provide a 
fertile context‘ for applying these two notions to explain the extension of the scope of 
segmentation in the Chinese bureaucratic system
50
. Thus, some individuals in 
government agencies were prominently committed to reshaping the policy formulation. 
Mertha described these individuals as ‗policy entrepreneurs‘; this characterized the 
strong willingness of committing resources and efforts to altering or shaping the forms 
or consequences of policies that they were concerned with the most
51
. Mintrom and 
Vergari summarized the functions of policy entrepreneurs, including: (1) discovering 
alternative and creative methods or channels to amplify their issues or arguments; (2) 
willingness to bear a certain degree of risks while being involved in striving for goals 
with uncertain consequences; (3) coordinating, managing, and utilizing resources and 
networks so as to tackle various problems associated with collective actions
52
. Mertha 
added that the notion of policy entrepreneurship could explain the correlation between 
the existence of policy change and bargaining amongst agencies. He also argued that the 
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main sources of policy entrepreneurs could be identified from officials, social activists, 
and the media
53
.  
 Besides, he applied the concept of ‗coalitions‘ complementarily so as to explain 
the policy change in the FA model. Mertha recognized the forming of coalitions as the 
strategy of policy entrepreneurs to expand their own influences and political sphere
54
. 
Thus, individuals or agencies from diverse positions or backgrounds, but with a shared 
belief system, might be willing to coordinate and commit in collective activities over 
time; with such cohesion known as ‗advocacy coalitions‘ 55 . Mintorm and Vergari 
claimed that short-term self-interests amongst agencies could not effectively form 
coalitions due to the lack of a common belief system
56
.  
 Therefore, due to the segmented nature of the Chinese bureaucratic system that 
the FA model presented, Mertha further added policy entrepreneurship‘ and ‗coalitions‘ 
to illustrate how bureaucratic organs and activists in society can fight for and lobby their 
agenda, as well as contend or cooperate with others. He described that, 
‗……the political dynamics captured in the 
fragmented authoritarianism framework provide 
policy entrepreneurs with a road map, a playbook 
by which they can pursue their policy goals. They 
adopt the strategies that traditional institutions 
have used for decades to pursue their agendas and 
institutional mandates
57
.‘  
In other words, without refuting the arguments and contentions of Lieberthal‘s FA 
model, Mertha discovered the drawbacks of the model and added the notions of ‗policy 
entrepreneurship‘ and ‗coalition‘, as well as including emergent civil society into the 
consideration of the policy making process, so as to reinforce the explicability of the 
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model in the aspect of dynamic political changes. Indeed, Mertha‘s addition is an 
appropriate response to large-scale administrative reforms in 1998, especially through 
the enhancement of contributions for policy making in the civil society. He further 
explains that ‗the increasing levels of inclusion at some point reach a tipping point in 
which an ever-growing corporatist system begins to resemble a broader heterogeneous 
system of competing interests for parts of the policy pie
58
.‘  
Nevertheless, because of rapid social change in China after economic 
liberalization, the functions of bureaucracy had been seriously constrained. There exists 
a rising trend in the occurrence of social protests throughout different parts of China. A 
number of scholars, observers and commentators have contributed in this aspect to study 
this rising trend. So did Mertha, and he noticed and extended the scope of the theoretical 
framework of fragmented authoritarianism. He argued that the model should include 
more actors -- such as intellectuals, individual activists and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) -- in the framework so as to adapt it to the rapid change in the 
political and social environment of China
59
. He pointed out the weaknesses of 
bureaucratic units in responding to the enormous necessity in a rapidly changed society 
in which interest groups and citizens are much more aggressive in fighting for their own 
interests than before
60
. NGOs are regarded as filling this gap. They act as supplementary, 
rather than hostile, to the authority like their western counterparts
61
. For example, they 
could absorb the officials dismissed from the restructuring of the government in 1998
62
. 
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Subsequently, it is necessary to include in the consideration of policy making in these 
two projects in the perspective of social organizations. 
 In short, the fragmented authoritarianism, according to Lieberthal, is a model to 
study the bargaining within the bureaucracy, in which how the central leadership, 
provincial governments and functional ‗clusters‘ of ministries negotiate with each other 
so as to fight for their own interests and fulfill their roles. However, the generalization of 
the model was challenged, particularly after the June-Fourth Massacre in 1989
63
. The 
limitations seem to be tackled by Mertha to add the emergent civil society into the 
investigation and to include the notion of ‗coalitions‘ and ‗policy entrepreneurship‘ to 
enrich the content of the FA model. This thesis further modified Mertha‘s contribution 
via the research dimension of bargaining triangle mentioned in above. As a result, this 
thesis could explain the reasons for the transformation of the dynamic of policy 
formulation, beyond to illustrate the rationales.  
NGO development and the FA model 
 Prior to this thesis, there are numerous contributions on state-society 
relationships in China. Especially after a wave of democratization in Eastern Europe, 
whether China would follow her western communist counterparts to have rapid 
development in democratization stirred up by the civil society has been discussed for 
years.  Due to the economic liberalization, the Chinese civil society has been 
transformed. It is no longer simple corporatist who gives a hand to promote state 
interests and policies. Morton described that ‗Chinese civil society is therefore best 
understood as a mix of state-sponsored social control and spontaneous grassroots 
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activity‘ 64 . In effect, it is impossible to completely neglect the existence of state 
intervention in the civil society in China.  
Schwartz also noticed the transformation of the state-society relationship. He 
reviewed the development history of ENGOs, the most successful NGOs in China, in the 
post-Mao period and tried to answer whether Chinese ENGOs could act supplementarily 
to the state in dealing with the environmental challenges or could strike the state just like 
their Eastern European counterparts. Two portrayals of scenarios in China were 
generalized: With the aids of Graph 1-3, he stated the conception of ‗corporatism‘. This 
concept portrayed the political space of ENGOs as being occupied by the state because 
of the authoritarian nature of PRC. Under the assumption of conventional Confucian 
education, Chinese NGOs prefer to respect the authority of the state, rather than 
challenge it.  Notwithstanding the rising roles and contribution of NGOs, they would not 
be willing to be hostile against the state. As a result, to maintain the balance between the 
state and the civil society, there would be a longer time to have a persistent negotiation
65
.  
Graph 1-3 – Political Space of ENGOs Occupied by the State and Society 
Source: Figure 1 in Schwartz, 2008:.69  
Nevertheless, the situation has been questioned because of decentralization and 
intensive emphasis on economic development accompanied by the economic reforms. 
For instance, Liu has argued that political injustice or uneven distribution of political 
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privileges makes people to accumulate their discontent against the authorities. This 
discontent from society is believed to be the major dynamic pushing the emergence of 
civil society of China. He uncovered two incompatible logical mindsets between 
Chinese civilian and elite. This contradiction probably deteriorates the situation of the 
communist regime. As a result, the Chinese authorities are ‗sitting on a powder keg‘66.  
Schwartz has another description which pictures ENGOs functioned as a dual role based 
on this circumstance. Due to the failure of the state to fully implement policies to 
achieve diverse goals in a range of aspects and to fulfill the public‘s expectation 
accurately, NGOs supported the state to achieve the goals of specific issues, like 
environment protection, and participated actively in broadening the political space 
through taking up a part of state‘s responsibilities67. 
Graph 1-4 – Political Space of ENGOs in the Public Sphere and State’s Delegation 
Source: Figure 2 in Schwartz, 2008: p.70 
Thus seen, the state-society relationship is different. The roles of NGOs are more 
aggressive and a pattern of confronting the state seems to exist (see Graph 1-4). He 
concluded that ‗[a]lthough the process may still be in its infancy, Chinese society seems 
to be following a more confrontational path, expanding its role and moving in the 
direction of challenging the state‘68.  
 Similarly, Ho argued that the ENGOs in China are not fully confronting the state. 
He suggested the terminology of ‗embedded social activism‘ to portray the party-society 
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relationship. In the semi-authoritarian context, ENGOs are engaged to participate in the 
decision-making process, but nevertheless, the room of participation was acquiesced to 
by the party-state. The party-state had the experience of clamping down on civil groups 
without any hesitation. As a result, activists and ENGOs would try to stay in the 
acceptable areas in which the party-state would tolerate
69
. He said,  
‗Chinese green activists profess a ―female 
mildness‖ – a greening without conflict, 
environmentalism at a safe distance from direct 
political action…Green social organizations are 
increasingly courting government favor in the hope 
of influencing policy-making, and they avoid 
potentially dangerous confrontation with the state‘70. 
In contrast to Schwartz‘s argument, Ho stressed on the interactions of the civil society 
and the state. He thought that the current development of civil society in China is the 
consequence of ‗self-filtering‘ of social organizations and ‗self-awakening‘ of the 
authorities
71
. In other words, it is shaped by the informal consensus and interactive 
coordination between the party-state and civil society.  
 In sum, the ENGOs in China have a relatively open and free room for them to 
lobby their interests. In addition, they have more functions than before as they do not 
only act as supplementary to, but also complementary to, the state. The function of 
‗check-and-balance‘ is much more obvious than before72. Their operations have been 
more independent from the authority. Besides, regardless of which mode of the ENGOs 
are adopting to deal with their correlation with the party state, their influences of policy 
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making could no longer be neglected. In an interview, Mertha has commented that 
‗[f]ifteen years ago, opponents of large-scale dam projects in China were greeted with 
indifference or repression. Today they are a part of the hydropower policy-making 
process itself‘73. Wong & Chan pointed out that the party-state and the civil society are 
inter-influential. They help each other to transform and accommodate
74
, but how much 
they thereby pressure the authorities in the aspect of policy implementation is a question 
addressed in this dissertation. Mertha employed the notions of ‗policy entrepreneurship‘ 
and ‗issue framing‘ to enrich the content of FA model so as to adopt changes and 
maintain explicability of the model. Admittedly, Mertha‘s enrichment could effectively 
tackle the weaknesses of the model of neglecting the significance of social organizations 
and explain how organizations influenced the policy making. However, it overlooked the 
importance of the perception of actors in policy making and failed to picture the 
transformation of policy making process in China. As a result, this thesis did not only 
include social organizations in policy making process, but also adopted an interactive 
approach to analyze the success and failure of the TGP and NRP respectively so as to 
generalize the transformation of policy making process in reform period and show how 
the FA model could be employed to explain the policy making in China.  
Structure of Thesis 
 The thesis consists of six chapters. In this chapter, the model of fragmented 
authoritarianism is discussed. Apart from the vast bureaucracy in China, the civil society, 
or more accurately the ENGOs, should be considered as important actors in the decision-
making process of hydropower development. Besides, by reviewing a series of 
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literatures about Chinese bureaucratic system and civil society, the status quo in these 
respects could be briefly understood.  
 In chapter 2, the history of hydropower development of China is investigated. 
Why is dam construction important to Chinese economic development? This question 
would be addressed in this chapter. In addition, TGP and NRP would be highlighted and 
their importance would be stated. On the other hand, the history and rationale of 
economic decentralization would be embodied in this chapter. This arrangement would 
on the one hand be able to set forth the context of projects, on the other hand be able to 
provide a solid ground for analysis. 
 Chapter 3 is the starting point for discussing the respective bargaining with local 
administrations and ENGOs of the central government. The rationales of the distinct 
responses and values of the central authority in these two projects would be explained 
here. The implicit meanings of these two projects for leadership would thereby be 
inferred. Thus, how the central government, including both the central leadership and the 
central authorities, will be illustrated. The results of NRP and TGP will be explained in 
the central perspective. 
 After that, another bargaining node in the triangular relationship suggested in 
chapter 1 would be concentrated. The roles, interests of local governments would be 
discussed in chapter 4. Beyond local governments themselves, the interactions with the 
centre and ENGOs in local governments‘ perspective would also be reflected. Why were 
local senior cadres so enthusiastic about constructing dams in their paddocks? And how 
did they value the TGP and NRP respectively? All these questions would be answered in 
this chapter.  
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 In chapter 5, the civil society and its bargaining node with the state would be 
analyzed. How the ENGOs penetrated their influences into the decision-making process 
of these two projects and why this existed would be expounded. It would be argued that 
how the domestic ENGOs allied with its international counterparts to achieve their goals 
in the NRP which they were prohibited doing so in the TGP, would clarify the roles of 
foreign activists.  
 Finally, a full picture of analysis would be indicated in the chapter 6, which is the 
conclusion chapter of the thesis. Apart from answering the questions concerning the 
fragmented authoritarianism model, general findings would be summarized and utilized 
to argue that the refined FA model is still applicable in China. Besides, findings in the 
research could help clarify the essence and features of the Chinese political landscape. 
Implications of general findings would enable us to forecast the weaknesses and 
limitations of China in its efforts to develop its hydropower. The most decisive question 
of determining the success of dam construction in China is whether the central 
leadership is willing to take up the role of driver, or just a coordinator, in the project. 
The priorities assigned to the projects and pressures arising from their execution would 
be the most determining factors in influencing the decision of leadership to answer this 
question. 
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Chapter 2 – Hydropower Development in China 
 In the previous chapter, the objectives of this thesis were briefly introduced. The 
significance of this research basically relied on China‘s rapid economic development in 
the late 20
th
 century. When China has been further urbanized, industrialized and 
modernized, power supply would become one of the most critical problems that the 
government needs to deal with. In this chapter, the history of hydropower development 
in China would be discussed, in particular the history after the establishment of the PRC 
and economic liberalization. Additionally, why Chinese government seems to emphasize 
the necessity of hydropower development would be discussed. Via qualitative and 
quantitative data, this chapter would demonstrate that hydropower development is not a 
mere economic decision, but essentially a political decision. Through large-scale dam 
construction, the CCP could effectively consolidate its legitimacy. Apart from 
discussing the significance of hydropower development in a historical approach, the 
background of TGP and NRP were introduced respectively so as to provide empirical 
ground for analyses and arguments in the following chapters. In the modern world, water 
resources management does not only concern the passive sense of preventing natural 
crises, say flooding or drought, but also require functioning in an active sense of 
generating electricity. For example, the two cases studied in this thesis – the TGP & 
NRP – were constructed for both passive and active senses. In this chapter, the active 
sense of large-scale dam construction projects will be focused upon after the functions of 
these projects were introduced. Besides, incidents in the decision making processes of 
the TGP and NRP will also be briefly reviewed so as to present a rough overview of 
hydropower development in China before conducting in-depth analysis of 
transformation in the decision-making processes.  
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  As one of the countries with the longest history in the world, China‘s fate seems 
to be closely tied with water resources management. It is not only because of the vast 
size of the Chinese population, but also the Confucian tradition. In the feudal period, the 
absolute majority of the population was peasantry. Stable access for water resources was 
extremely critical to maintaining their livelihood. Their political satisfaction for leaders 
and regimes was largely related to stable harvests and livelihood. Additionally, the 
absolute power of feudal Chinese emperors was derived from the Heaven‘s mandate, so 
flooding, drought and earthquakes were believed to be indicators of distrust from 
Heaven. As such, successful water resources management could determine sustainability 
and decay of empires and dynasties. It has profound political significance, rather than 
mere economic significance, in China
75
. This concept seems to have been retained while 
time passes. Beyond ordinary people, the leadership of PRC is even more likely to 
uphold this conception. Subsequently, the Chinese people have praised large dams as 
effective and contributing tools of development by political elite
76
. Furthermore, 
Leninist ideologies highly praised dam construction as the tool of defeating nature by 
humanity in ideological sense
77
. As a result, Mao Zedong, as the loyal follower of 
Leninism, stressed and even implemented a series of dam construction projects within 
several years in spite of the severe poverty and famine in China, particularly during the 
Great Leap Forward period. Unfortunately, the furious speed of construction was 
associated with the detrimental quality of dams and inexpiable loss of life and properties. 
One of the best illustrations is the Sanmenxia Project at Yellow River. This project was 
approved in 1957 and completed in 1960. It was a symbol of Sino-Soviet intimacy in the 
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1950s since it was designed by Soviet experts. Nevertheless, the dam had seriously 
suffered by the problem of extensive sand sedimentations. All functions of the dam, 
including hydroelectricity generation, were completely suspended and a huge area in the 
upstream to became inundated.  Eventually, the dam was practically abandoned
78
. 
According to Jasper, approximately 3500 dams collapsed and more than 33,000 dams 
were at the edge of collapse
79
. Notwithstanding deep remorse from previous dam 
construction efforts; the Chinese leadership did not eliminate its fascination for mega 
hydropower projects; on the contrary, the appetite for energy because of industrialization 
further stimulated its determination to encourage hydropower development.  
Indeed, the political value of dam construction in the mindset of elite should 
never thereby be underestimated. On the contrary, the multi-functional nature of dam 
construction projects further justifies the necessity of these projects for the political elite, 
particularly due to the economic value in generating hydroelectricity. For example, the 
central leaders frequently emphasized that the TGP was designed for at least three 
functions – electricity generation, flooding prevention and navigation80, to underpin its 
necessity. Notwithstanding the multi-functional nature of modern dam construction, 
hydroelectricity generation would be stressed in this research. Quantitative data indicates 
that why hydroelectricity generation is the most noteworthy factor in contemporary 
Chinese dam construction. In absolute term, the amount of hydroelectricity consumption 
since ‗Open-door‘ policy in China is shown in Chart 2.1. It is not difficult to discover 
that the amount of hydroelectricity consumed in China steadily escalates. More than 100 
million tonnes oil equivalent hydroelectricity was consumed annually. In addition, the 
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pace of growth has accelerated to have no less than 8% growth per annum after entering 
the new century
81
. In order to further reflect the significance of hydroelectricity to the 
worldwide – in particular Chinese – economic development, the shares of 
hydroelectricity for total primary energy consumed in the world and China are 
calculated and contrasted in the Chart 2.2. The chart reflects the fact that the significance 
of hydroelectricity for energy consumption has been increasingly reinforced in China. In 
the initial stage of economic reform, the percentage of hydroelectricity to primary 
energy consumption was slightly higher at 2%, but the share could have caught up with 
the global level recently, i.e. at more than 6%.  
Chart 2.1 – Hydroelectricity Consumption in China, 1978-2008 
Source: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy -- June 2009 
Both chart 2.1 and 2.2 could prove the high value and importance of 
hydroelectricity for China on the demand side. They indicate that hydroelectricity 
becomes another significant energy source beyond conventional hydrocarbon thermal in 
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both absolute and relative terms. Apparently, rapid industrialization and urbanization 
after economic reform demanded greater consumption of electricity. Besides, the charts 
reflect that the pace of utilization of hydroelectricity could not catch up with the growth 
of national energy demand in China. The absolute amount of hydroelectricity 
consumption start to increase sharply between 2003 and 2008 approximately twofold, 
but the share of hydroelectricity to primary energy consumption remained around 5.5-
6% in this period, which is slightly lower than the global average level. Thus, despite the 
rapid development, hydroelectricity seems not to be sufficient in meeting the national 
electricity demand. Subsequently, hydroelectricity could not fully replace conventional 
fossil fuels to become the largest energy source of China in spite of intensive 
development since the establishment of the ‗open-door‘ policy.  
Chart 2.2 – Share of Hydroelectricity to Primary Energy Consumption in the 
World & China, 1978-2008 
Source: Calculated by author; Data from BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy -- June 2009 
 On the supply side, Chart 2.3 shows the composition of electricity generation in 
China between 1987 and 2007. There is no doubt about the skyrocketing of electricity 
generation in China and the conventional thermal is apparently the largest source of 
electricity throughout the statistical period. Moreover, the share of conventional thermal 
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does not have any trend of deterioration. In contrast, hydroelectricity has a narrower gap 
in the chart, but the share is reinforcing and the gap is widening. Thus, hydroelectricity 
plays a more significant role of electricity generation in the contemporary China.  
 Data in above reflects the considerable economic values of dam construction and 
developing hydroelectricity in both demand and supply senses. Rapid economic and 
social modernization since the late 1970s did not mitigate but did stimulate the demand 
for dam construction and hydroelectricity development. Thus, the Chinese government 
approved and gave high priority to expanding power projects after the conservative 
power shortages in 2003 and 2004
82
. 
Chart 2.3 – China’s Electricity Generation by Type, 1987-2007 
 
Source: EIA, Energy Information Administration -- Country Analysis Brief (Updated in July 2009), 
[Internet] (assessed on 17 December 2009), available on http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/pdf.pdf 
Apart from the ideological and economic considerations that hydroelectricity 
brings, dam construction projects are also justified by its contribution to energy security.  
According to the United Nations, the official definition of ‗energy security‘ is the 
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persistent and adequate availability of energy at affordable prices
83
. Nevertheless, 
different states have their diverse emphases on this definition because of their different 
situations, so they have different interpretations on this notion. For China, because it 
could no longer retain its self-sufficient energy circumstance, energy security 
emphasized the ability to freely and promptly adjust itself to its reliance on global 
energy market
84
. Hughes further modified 4 ‗R‘ principles as dimensions to examine 
energy security for states. They are: Review, reduce, replace and restrict
85
. ‗Replace‘ 
refers to reliance on secure energy supplies instead of another insecure one by 
diversifying, changing infrastructure and encouraging development of alternative energy 
sources. In China, conventional fossil fuels which were highly relied upon have led to 
damages for the society and economy. China is the largest consumer of coal in the 
world
86
, but consuming coal is one of the ‗dirtiest‘ methods for generating power. Thus, 
the central authorities would like to reduce the reliance on burning coals so as to 
suppress the amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission. Apart from burning coal, 
conventional hydrocarbon is another resource to be consumed for electricity and power. 
The Chinese leadership and even the global economy worried the supply security of 
fossil fuels and the instability of the Middle East in recent times
87
. Generating 
hydroelectricity would mitigate the over-dependence on fossil fuels for China. As a 
consequence, prompting development of hydroelectricity by dam construction is viewed 
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as a strategic remedy of alleviating the threat of energy security in China. It also 
explains why the central leadership since Mao‘s administration has hoped to reinforce 
the share of hydroelectricity in electricity generation instead of burning coals
88
. With the 
considerable initial investment of dam construction, Chinese leaders have retained their 
strong determination for developing hydroelectricity. For instance, former Premier Li 
Peng expressed his great ambition of boosting the share of hydropower to the total 
energy production for no less than 30% by 2010
89
. A Chinese hydrologist from the 
Chinese Academy of Engineering even described hydropower is ‗the only viable way‘ of 
curtailing the coal consumption of China
90
.  
Chart 2.4 – The Largest Hydroelectricity Consumers in the World, 2008 
 
Source: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy -- June 2009, [Internet] (Accessed on 4 December 
2009); available on 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statisti
cal_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2009_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy_f
ull_report_2009.pdf  
As such, dam construction projects have never been criticized in the 
contemporary China. On the contrary, the advanced technology of construction has 
                                                             
88 Dai Qing & Lawrence Sullivan, ‘The Three Gorges Dam and China’s Energy Dilemma’, Journal of 
International Affairs (Fall 1999): 62-63. 
89 Ibid: 62-65. 
90
 Pan Jiazheng, interviewed by Antoaneta Bezlova, ‘China’s Three Gorges Dam Comes of Age’, Asia Times 
[Internet] available from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/KK04Ad01.html (accessed on 4 Dec., 
2009), (Nov., 2009) 
  35 
broadened the purposes of dams and further justified its necessity and feasibility of their 
construction. Subsequently, Chinese authorities are so enthusiastic about constructing 
numerous dams throughout the domain that British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has  
portrayed the enthusiasm of the authorities to develop hydroelectricity in words like 
‗[t]he five great rivers of Asia all rise in China… China wants to dam them all‘91. 
Hydroelectricity acts a more important role for supporting furious industrialization and 
urbanization. Thus, it is not strange that China could become the largest single 
hydroelectricity consumer. Chart 2.4 shows that the amount of hydroelectricity 
consumed by China was tantamount to the half of what the OECD members consumed 
in 2008.  
 By way of a short conclusion, dam construction in China has strong significance 
beyond effective water management. It was a symbolic icon of humankind to defeat 
nature and overcome devastating natural disasters, in particular, occasional flooding of 
rivers. Moreover, modern technological improvement has contributed to the 
diversification of functions for dam construction. Hydroelectricity generation is the most 
tempting factor for state to commit in grand dam projects. This statement is particularly 
true in energy-hungry China. As a consequence, hydropower development is the aspect 
that this research would like to concentrate on. In the coming section, the Three Gorges 
Project (TGP) approved in the 1990s and the Nu River Project (NRP) suspended in 2003 
would be discussed so as to explain the reasons of choosing these two specific projects 
as case studies. Besides, their background of construction and controversies would also 
be briefly introduced respectively.  
                                                             
91
Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, ‘Satisfying China’s Demand for Energy’, BBC News, 16 February 2006, [Internet] 
(assessed on 11 June 2008), available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4716528.stm  
  36 
Project Concentration 
 Prior to discussing the background of the projects individually, the objectives of 
these two projects would be introduced. Previously mentioned, the modern dam 
construction was multi-functional. Similarly, the functions of TGP and NRP are also 
diverse. In the Table 2.5, their estimated direct benefits to the economy are listed.  
Table 2.5 -- Functions and Estimated Direct Benefits of Projects 
Items/Project Three Gorges Project
(1) 
Nu River Project
(2) 
Hydroelectricity 
Generation (Installed 
Capacity) 
17,680 MW 23,320 MW 
Total Storage Capacity 39.3 billion m
3 
15.1 billion m
3 
Flood Control Storage  22.1 billion m
3 
N/A 
Navigation Reservoir level increases 
10-100m to allow 10,000 
tons to travel to the 
upstream 
N/A 
Sources: (1) Extract from Table 3, Samuel Robert Fishleigh Allin, ‗An Examination of China‘s Three 
Gorges Dam Project Based on Framework‘, [e-Paper Presented in the Report of the World Commission on 
Dams] (2004):16, available from: http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-12142004-
125131/unrestricted/SAllin_010304.pdf (accessed on 15 May 2010); (2) Extract from Table 7, John Dore 
& Yu Xiaogang, Update on China‘s Energy Industry Reforms and the Nu, Lancang & Jinsha Hydropower 
Dams, [Online Working Paper] (Mar. 2004): 14-15, available from: 
http://www.chinariversproject.org/files/Dore%20Yu%20Yunnan%20Hydropower%20Expansion.pdf 
(accessed on 15 May 2010) . 
In the previous section, the shortfall in, and appetite of, energy in China have been 
demonstrated. However, the conventional thermal energy supplies brought various 
drawbacks for Chinese environment, economy and strategic security. In order to 
diversify energy supplies, giant dam construction projects were deemed necessary to 
facilitate the hydroelectricity supply. Moreover, the central government prompted 
economic development in the Western regions so as to mitigate the income disparity 
between the prosperous coastal and inferior provinces. In Graph 2.6, the GDP growth 
rates of Chongqing Municipality and Yunnan province, where the Three Gorges Dam 
and the Nu River Dams are located in, as well as Chinese national data, are shown. 
Referring to the graph, economic growth in Chongqing and Yunnan was varying and the 
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trends were close to the national trend. However, Chongqing has had a greater economic 
growth than the national average since 1992. It might probably be due to the enormous 
capital injection for the TGP and its resettlement campaign.  
Graph 2.6 – GDP Growth Rate of China, Chongqing Municipal City and Yunnan 
Province 
 
Source: CEIC Database 
On the contrary, without the Nu river dams, Yunnan‘s economic growth rate has been 
lower than the national level. Therefore, one may conclude that gigantic dam 
construction projects, including TGP and NRP, were instruments to boast the domestic 
economic growth of provinces.  
 On the other hand, both TGP and NRP were selected amongst a variety of dam 
construction projects in China mainly because of their massive economic contribution to 
the country, as well as to the local government. Besides, these two projects were chosen 
because of the wide scope of the authorities and society in committing to both projects. 
Another reason for picking these projects is their international controversies. The 
Lancang-Mekong River Project was a project which has drawn intensive attention from 
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international society and mass media, as it has led to diplomatic negotiations amongst 
littoral countries. Thus, the consequences of Mekong Project might probably be 
influenced by the diplomatic pressure from Chinese neighbours. In contrast, Nu River is 
another transboundary river which originates from the Yunnan province, but foreign 
diplomatic leverage in the NRP seems to be insignificant because the Burmese 
government did not exhibit any fierce responses alike what Vietnamese and Thai 
governments did against the Mekong Project. Since this research would like to 
investigate the effective transformation of domestic factors in influencing the decision 
making of hydropower development in China since economic reform, the Mekong 
Project, albeit its greater fame, would be eliminated from the cases chosen to be studied 
in this thesis.  
Development of Three Gorges Project  
 Yangtze River (or also known as Changjiang) is the longest river and the largest 
river system in China. It penetrates the whole domain of China from Tibet and Qinghai 
in the west to the East Sea. Millions of people‘s livelihoods traditionally relied on the 
river, especially for the residents in rural regions. Due to the vital importance of the 
Yangtze, the Three Gorges Project experienced more than a half-century of debates and 
political indecision which is uncommon for dam construction projects on the globe. 
Even with the construction near completion, the debates about the project have not 
subsided yet. In retrospect, the idea of TGP was first suggested by Sun Yat-sen in the 
1920s. In his vision of developing China, Sun believed the necessity of hydroelectricity 
to drive the modernization of China and highlighted the huge potential for generating 
  39 
hydro-electricity at Yichang, Hubei
92
. Graph 2.7 illustrated the area of reservoir and 
inundation after the completion of TGP, which is located in Yichang.  
Graph 2.7 – Map of Three Gorges Dam and Reservoir Area 
 
Source: Figure 1, Hu Yong, ‗Mapping methane emissions from the three gorges reservoir area: A 
feasibility study‘ GIS Development, [Internet] (accessed on 6 January 2010) available from: 
http://www.gisdevelopment.net/application/environment/water/ma04240a.htm  
Sun‘s positive argument of hydroelectricity is similar to Vladimir Lenin‘s. Lenin 
proclaimed that electricification is one of the necessary reasons for communism – the 
ideal stage of social development in Marxian philosophy – and the Soviet power is 
another one
93
. Sun‘s dream hydraulic power was inherited by his successors and 
following famous leaders, Chiang Kai-Shek, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Mao 
even visited Yangtze and affirmed the necessity of TGP in journeys. He wrote a poem to 
reveal his desire to utilize the project to on the one hand to enrich the country; and on 
the other hand, resolve occasionally the deadly flooding of the river
94
, 
Snails move with the wind. 
Tortoise and snake still 
Great Plans are afoot: 
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… 
Walls of stone will stand upstream to the west 
To hold back Wushan‘s clouds and rain 
Till smooth lake rises in the narrow gorges. 
The mountain goddess if she is still there 
Will marvel at a world so changed
95
. 
Mao‘s poem reflected the view that the TGP is more than a mere infrastructure project; 
it could also symbolize the prosperity and power of China. As a result, the project has 
enjoyed a great flock of prestige and praises from the authorities and leaderships even 
after the death of Mao.   
In spite of the great zealousness of leaders, the unprecedented enormous costs 
and commitments necessary for undertaking the project had never been overlooked. 
Subsequently, there had been great debate on feasibility of the project for more than 50 
years, and it did not achieve any consensus. In the 1980s, although Deng Xiaoping – the 
paramount leader – decided to establish the construction of TGP, there were still fierce 
debates within the bureaucratic system, and even the central leadership, on various 
issues pertaining to the project. The Ministry of Water Conservancy and Electricity was 
ordered to gather professional planning and surveys for the proposed TGP
96
. Hence, the 
project had not been substantially established and remained the stage of planning. This 
cleavage will be discussed in the coming chapter. Until 1989, the State Council proposed 
the feasibility survey report to the National People Congress (NPC) for approval. This 
was the initiation of the central government to promote the Three Gorges Project 
systematically and formally. It was not approved by the NPC at that time, which decided 
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to shelve it for seven years so as to have time to conduct in-depth investigation on the 
feasibility and planning of the project
97
.  
The debates did not only exist within the massive bureaucracy, it also expanded 
to the civil society. A number of intellectuals and individual activists in China, led by 
Dai Qing, allied with foreign mass media organs to publish or publicize criticisms 
against TGP
98
. They struck the feasibility of the project in various perspectives and their 
arguments stirred up controversy about the TGP in abroad. Shockingly, the shelved 
proposal was re-submitted again to the fifth meeting of 7
th
 NPC in 1992. Unfortunately, 
these three foregoing years did not bring any consensus for the project within the 
bureaucracy. The NPC voting results revealed that cleavages were not completely erased. 
In Table 2.8, the voting results of the TGP in the NPC are listed. Over 30% of delegates 
voted against or abstain from the project. Subsequently, the existence of resistance in the 
NPC should not be underestimated or neglected. 
Table 2.8 – Voting Results of the Proposal of the TGP in NPC on 3 April 1992 
Items of Vote Agree Disagree Abstain Total 
Numbers of Vote 1767 177 664 2608 
Percentage of 
Vote
99
 
67.75% 6.79% 25.46% 100% 
Source: Heggelund, 2004: 32 
Some sensitive scholars pointed out the correlation between political atmosphere at that 
period and the voting results and disclosed the political significance of the TGP. It was 
claimed that the hasty and divided decision of the NPC towards the project was 
manipulated by the Zhongnanhai so as to consolidate the legitimacy of communist party 
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state, as the June-Fourth Massacre seriously damaged the legitimacy of Chinese 
communist party as the ruling party. The cruel and autocratic oppression stirred up 
questions about the deterioration and continuity of the party leadership
100
. Meanwhile, 
the TGP was a prestige project of the nation for Chinese political and intellectual elite
101
. 
Therefore, any opposition against the project was thoroughly suppressed so as to 
smoothen the implementation as soon as possible.  
 According to the official plan, the TGP is currently near completion and it should 
have already generated electricity for several years. However, criticisms and problems 
are gradually uncovered, in particular in the aspect of resettlement. Debate on the 
projects seems to be more rigorous. This phenomenon is the consequence of the 
inadequate transparency and narrow scope of participation
102
. It typically reflects that 
the characteristics of first stage of hydropower development in China – the major driver 
of project is the central authorities, and other bureaucracies as well as the civil society 
are just the agents for implementing policies and actualizing the visions and directions 
proposed by the centre. 
Development of Nu/Salween River Project 
 The Nu River (also known as ‗Salween River‘ in Southeast Asia) is one of the 
largest river systems in Asia and critical trans-boundary water network of China and her 
South-East Asian neighbours. Locating in the most remote region of China, the Nu River 
remains undeveloped for dams. Its unique ecological and environmental resources have 
never been exploited. The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) announced the solitary landscape of ‗Three Parallel River‘ 
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(Sanjiang Biliu) near Nu River as a Cultural Heritage preserve in 2003, but the Yunnan 
provincial government proposed to construct 13 dams along the river one year after. 
This plan stirred up heat controversy within China and abroad. With reference to the 
Graph 2.9, the provincial office planned to construct 13 dams and two reservoir areas 
(liang ku shishan ji) at the upper reaches of the Nu River. It is expected that an installed 
capacity of over 23,000MW (megawatt) hydroelectricity will be generated after the 
completion of this project
103
. More than 50,000 people were estimated to be relocated 
due for relocation because of the project.  
 In contrast, the NRP is smaller scale than TGP in terms of resettlement and 
commitment of bureaucratic system, but it does not mean that it has a smoother 
implementation. On the contrary, the NRP has encountered a more rigorous debate 
during the planning process. In 2002-2003, the Chinese national power company was 
separated into 5 state-owned electricity corporations, and they are: China Huaneng 
Group, China Huadian Group, China Guodian Corporation, China Power Investment 
Corporation and China Datang Corporation. Competition amongst electricity groups 
motivated them to actively cooperate with provincial governments to develop 
hydroelectricity so as to maximize their returns from electricity generation
104
. This 
phenomenon was known as ‗enclosing rivers by marking preemptive investment‘ 
(Paoma Juanshui). The Huadian Group had achieved agreement with Yunnan‘s 
provincial government to establish a company to develop hydroelectricity from the Nu 
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River and invest capital to implement the proposal of NRP in 2003
105
. Prior to the 
agreement between Yunnan government and Huadian, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) approved the NRP proposal and the State Council then 
approved the NRP in March 2003
106
. Surprisingly, the Chinese ENGOs became major 
opponents and obstacles of the project. They criticized the project via various channels 
and strategies so as to reinforce the pressure on the central government to suspend the 
project. This transformation would be discussed in the chapter 5. In addition, the project 
was ordered to be shelved temporarily by Premier Wen Jiabao in order for it to be 
‗carefully discussed and decided on scientifically‘ in 2004107. This is a rare practice in 
Chinese politics. Therefore, the NRP has drawn the attention of scholars and 
commentators to investigate and analyze the emergence of civil society and grassroots‘ 
activisms in China.   
Graph 2.9 – Map of Nu River Project 
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Source: International Rivers [Internet] (accessed on 6 January 2010); available from 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/image/trd/109  
Even if there was anxiety about the re-submission of the proposal of NRP after Wen‘s 
order, the provincial authorities have been facing a heavy pressure from the public, 
mobilized by ENGOs, individual activists and even media to stop the project. The 
project has thereby not been implemented hitherto.  
 The NRP‘s failure was seen to reflect the increased pluralism in China. In effect, 
the project was not hindered not only by the state-society-level conflicts, but also 
obstructed by the diverse positions taken amongst bureaucracies and the interest 
conflicts underneath. Thus, the bargaining process of NRP effectively reflects pluralism 
in the contemporary China which is likely the consequence of economic liberalization.  
  In sum, dam construction should not be simply recognized as a policy of 
encouraging economic development since the notion of modernization is closely 
  46 
intertwined with development of hydroelectricity in China. Moreover, because China 
has over-relied on coals for energy generation, it would constitute a heavy burden of 
responsibility – both empirically and ethically – for China to curtail the greenhouse gas 
emission. Therefore, the development of hydroelectricity should be, and has been, 
encouraged due to its relatively ‗greener‘ stereotype in the viewpoint of Chinese 
authorities. The TGP and the NRP are typical exemplifiers reflecting the evolution of 
perceptions in favour of hydroelectricity. Additionally, they also indicated the 
transformation of the Chinese bureaucratic systems and the emergence of civil society, 
as shown by discussing their decision-making processes respectively.  
 In this chapter, the most significant events surrounding the decision-making 
processes of these two projects have been sketched respectively. Further in-depth 
interpretation would be mentioned in the following chapters and the attitudes of several 
actors towards each other would be analyzed. As a result, the determiningc factors that 
influenced the success or failure of the TGP and NRP could be induced. The first actor 
discussed in the next chapter is the central government.  
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Chapter 3 – Limitation of Project Governance: Fragmentation and 
Cleavages of the Central Authorities 
 In an authoritarian regime, the central government acts as the most critical part of 
the decision making process, at least in theory.  Moreover, the central government is 
perceived as the last referee of bureaucratic bargaining and coordination in the hierarchy. 
In the China‘s case, the central government is also a vital important actor to the 
decision-making process of mega projects, like the Three Gorges Project and Nu River 
Project. However, through investigating the decision making process and having the 
rationales analyzed in various perspectives, in addition to explaining the interaction 
between bureaucracies and organizations from the perspective of the centre, this chapter 
aims to examine how decision making towards the two projects by two generations of 
party leadership has changed, so as to reflect the limitation of the central leadership in 
policy formulation. In this chapter, the projects would be analyzed from the viewpoints 
of the centre. The interactions with provincial governments and ENGOs that the central 
authorities expected to have would also be included in this chapter. How the central 
government operated would be generalized and the political significance and interests of 
these two projects to the centre would be examined. Not only would central-provincial 
relationship and state-society relationship be understood, the structure of the central 
leadership would also be discerned.  
This chapter would argue that the fragmentation of interests inside the 
bureaucracies hampered the efficiencies of decision making. Moreover, this 
fragmentation was the largest obstacle obstructing the success of policy implementation. 
Subsequently, the transformation of polity in China enabled the interests of political 
organs to become more distinct, and it even brings about the dichotomy and coalition 
amongst organs in the centre. The difficulty of successful dam construction is greater. 
The first section of this chapter would give an analysis of the perspective of the centre 
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towards the TGP, and detail how the centre expected to work with the localities and 
society. Then, the relatively indifferent participation of the centre in the NRP would be 
discussed. Apart from considering the actions that centre chose to implement, this 
chapter would also study tactics of the centre behind these projects so as to indicate the 
priorities in the mind of central leadership. Prior to all these analysis, the notion of 
central leadership should be clarified.  
 In traditional communist political systems, the mighty communist party was 
granted the power of overruling, overseeing and managing public institutions, like the 
government, enterprises, civil society, etc. Thus, the Standing Committee of the 
Politburo of the CCP (Hereafter as ―PSC‖), which is the highest bureaucratic body of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), contains the most powerful elites of the Chinese 
government. This small group of officials is currently composed of 9 core leaders of the 
party state and is presided over by Hu Jintao
108
. The ‗central leadership‘ generally refers 
to this small group of elites in this thesis. On the other hand, there are a number of 
bureaucratic organs in the party and in the government under this layer of officials, such 
as ministries from the State Council, commissions and committees from the party and 
also the military. Vertically, all these bureaucratic organs in the central government 
seem to be subordinated to the central leadership, which suggests, promotes and 
executes its policy directions and planning through commands and orders. The National 
People‘s Congress (NPC) which is the highest legislative body in China is subsequently 
viewed as the ‗rubber stamp‘ of the central leadership and only ‗solidifies the central 
political tasks for the party‘109. Being the apex of authority in the Chinese political 
system, the central leadership enjoys the highest privilege and political status in the 
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system. However, it has been argued that the authority of the central leadership has been 
subjected to more challenges than at the beginning of the establishment of the state. The 
transformation of the political context, as encountered by the central leadership in these 
two projects, would be analyzed in the forthcoming sections to highlight the limitations 
of decision making by the leadership. 
The Centre in the TGP – Oppressive and Strong 
 If we were to go through the history of the TGP, we will discover how China‘s 
central authorities supported and praised the project; even though the political 
environment had remained unstable for century. No different from their predecessors, 
leaders of the PRC also praised the putative contribution of TGP. Notwithstanding 
strong controversies against the project domestically and abroad, as well as the 
anticipation of massive technical difficulties in advance, the central leadership insisted 
on constructing the enormous Three Gorges Dam. The major activities of the central 
government in the project could be summarized into three aspects -- ideological, 
financing and resettlement. 
 First, millions of people needed to be displaced because of inundation and the 
investment cost of the central government was estimated at approximately 90 billion 
yuan
110
. According to a local cadre from Chongqing municipality, the number of 
resettlers approximately reached 1.12-1.13 million. Over 20 cities or counties, 356 
communes, 116 townships and 1,711 villages were affected because of the project in 
2005
111
. Additionally, the whole hierarchy of the government needed to commit to the 
projects in different ways (see Table 3.1). Thus, leaders needed to promote the project 
and  legitimatize such unprecedented commitments of these units.  
                                                             
110 Yan Tan, Resettlement in the Three Gorges Project, (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 2008), 
19. It is estimated based on the price on the price level in the mid-1993 and the exchange rate of RMB 
against the U.S. is based on the level as at 2004, i.e. U.S.$1=RMB 8.27 yuan.  
111 Huang Qifan, captured from Yan Tan, 2008, 20. 
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Table 3.1 – Commitments of Various Stakeholders in TGP 
Aspect Stakeholders Responsibility (ies) Commitment(s) 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
Ministries & 
Departments at the 
Central Level112 
 To supervise the completion 
of project on time 
 To take up the responsibility 
of technical research and 
provide resources and 
information for relevant 
departments in the provincial 
level 
 To delegate authority to the 
branches at lower level 
 To be directly instructed and 
coordinated by the TGP 
Construction Committee under 
the State Council 
 To allocate 100 billion yuan of 
capital and resources to the 
construction site and reservoir 
areas for construction from 
1992113 
 To issue more than 8.7 billion 
yuan national bond for supporting 
economic and environment in 
reservoir areas from 2001 
Ministries & 
Departments at the 
Provincial Level
114
 
 Providing temptations to 
attract capital in the reservoir 
areas according to variety of 
circumstances in counties115 
  To set up resettlement bureau 
at various levels of the 
hierarchal so as to complete the 
resettlement campaign 
 To further implement policies 
from the central government in 
accordance with local situations, 
especially in the aspect of 
resettlement 
 To become the front-line 
delegates of the party state in order 
to overcome various problems in 
midst of the project 
 To provide sufficient 
compensation for relocating people 
and enterprises according to their 
different local situations and 
necessity of related people and 
enterprises116 
P
ri
v
at
e-
P
u
b
li
c 
 E
n
te
rp
ri
se
s 
State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) 
 To invest in the pillar 
industries of the reservoir areas 
so as to develop the economy 
 State-owned banks needed to 
manage the project funds for 
construction and economic 
development, as well as to 
provide direct loans for relevant 
SOEs or TVEs 
 Local SOEs needed to 
relocate to new reservoir areas 
and employ landless farmers 
after relocation 
 China Development Bank  
 Half of local inefficient SOEs 
were terminated before relocation 
  
Township-Village  To resettle in the newly-  Every TVEs received 7,000 yuan 
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Enterprises (TVEs)/ 
Private Enterprises 
in Reservoir Areas 
and nearby117 
established or resettled counties  
 To absorb landless farmers 
after relocation because of 
industrial transformation 
subsidy from the government for 
every employed resettler118 
 1.5million workers in Chongqing 
were employed in private 
sector119 
 
Generally, the central leadership embellished the necessity for, and significance of, the 
project ideologically with: Leninist and Nationalist doctrines. Li Peng, the former Prime 
Minister of State Council who proposed to construct the TGP and became the most 
important supporter of the project, stressed the aggregated contributions of the dam to 
anti-flooding, electricity generation, navigation and water supply, in his annual report at 
the 5
th
 Meeting of the 7
th
 National People‘s Congress120. Ordinary Chinese people were 
generally brainwashed by the notion that ‗humans must conquer nature‘ from Leninist 
doctrines during Mao‘s administration. The TGP came to be valued as the symbol of 
humanity‘s success in overcoming natural constraints. Particularly, because the middle 
reaches of Yangtze were frequently struck by devastating flooding, the project was 
praised as a triumphant instrument of humankinds to defeat natural disasters
121
. The 
leadership, besides, praised the success of the construction of the TGP ideologically as 
reflecting of ‗Chairman Mao‘s desire‘ (Mao zhuxi de xinyuan) and ‗Deng Xiaoping‘s 
support and concern‘ (Deng Xiaoping de zhichi he guanxin)122. The TGP was justified in 
term of the social and economic development of China.  Nevertheless, Dai criticized the 
project as reflecting ‗uncontrolled‘ (Bujia jiezhi) development in China. It represented 
the conscious reluctance of the Chinese government to restrain itself from pursuing 
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development
123
. In sum, the central authorities lobbied and promoted the project with its 
socialist and developmentalist ideologies. This action was criticized by foreign activists 
and the mass media as irrational and inefficient
124
 .  
 Alternatively, the central authorities were also required to address questions 
pertaining to the financing of the project after approval was given. Particularly the 
World Bank (WB) which is one of the largest lenders for dam construction projects in 
the world was not involved in financing the project. As a result, the Chinese authorities 
needed to finance the project solely. To overcome the considerable cost of construction, 
they proposed three sources of financing beyond direct capital injection from the centre, 
and they are: 1) fixed percentage sharing of revenue from electricity sold to the 
construction fund; 2) domestic loans from the China Development Bank;
125
 and, 3) 
allocating a proportion of revenue from the Gezhouba Hydro-Dam which is just nearby 
with the account of the fund managed by the China Construction Bank (CBC)
126
. The 
capital injected for dam construction was collectively managed by the China Three 
Gorges Corporation (CTGC).To seek for sufficient sources for the project is an 
important and exclusive responsibility of the central government. Unfortunately, the 
diverse methods of collecting capital were not unable to fulfill the appetite of the project; 
it is largely because the returns of electricity sales would be ex-post and only contribute 
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to the project in 2003. Thus the central government remained the largest investor for the 
project before 2003
127
.  
 Traditionally, involuntary resettlement tends to be coordinated and mobilized by 
the state. Thus, another responsibility of the central government is to address the 
enormous resettlement issues associated with the project. The TGP construction resulted 
in an unprecedented number of resettlers displaced from their lands. It was a vast 
challenge for the Chinese authorities on how to persuade, arrange and manage the 
resettlement of more than a million of affected people. Hence, the authorities proposed 
the concept of ‗development-oriented resettlement‘ and guaranteed that, 
‗…the residents-resettlement funds shall be used in an 
overall way, the resources rationally exploited, the 
ecological environment protected and the residents to 
be resettled properly relocated to ensure that their 
working and living conditions reach or surpass their 
previous level and that favourable conditions are 
created for the economic and social development in 
the Three Gorges reservoir area.
 128‘  
In other words, the regulation provides legal guarantee for those relocated that 
their livelihoods would improve after the relocation and requests relevant administration 
units to prevent impoverishment. Through this regulation, the ordinary people would 
hopefully view relocation as an opportunity for improving their livelihoods. In addition 
to the embellishment on the economic significance of the project for the state and 
ideological mobilization from the party, people generally perceived themselves to be 
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relocated involuntarily but still able to achieve collective improvement
129
. Consequently, 
people were more likely to be mobilized for relocation
130
.  
After the debatable approval of the Three Gorges Project from the NPC, 
repressions against domestic opposition seemed to be more frequent and rigorous. In 
order to further legitimatize the project, the government banned any opposition voices in 
the society and mass media. For example, a publicity campaign which aimed to guide 
public opinion and mass media to publish favourable reports, editorials and 
commentaries was launched before the approval of TGP from NPC in 1992
131
. These 
actions reflected that mere ideological persuasions and economic meanings could no 
longer suffice to explain the strong attitude of the central leadership. Therefore, the 
political meanings of the project in the central perspective should be included in the 
analysis. 
Political Background of the Centre in the late-1980s in the Construction of the TGP 
The greatest political incident and challenge to the CCP in the late-1980s should 
be the June-Fourth Massacre after which the CCP was presented with a severe 
legitimacy challenge on both domestic and international levels because of the cruel 
oppression. It was hence necessary for the party leadership to seek means for 
consolidating its legitimacy. As mentioned in chapter 2, the TGP is a symbol of national 
pride of China. The lengthy history of foreign invasion since the late Qing dynasty 
contributed to the Chinese having a fervid fantasy for sovereign strength and prosperity. 
For example, the Self-Strengthening Movement in the late Qing Dynasty enforced a 
variety of military modernization to defend against invasions by Western imperialist 
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powers, and the Great Leap Forward Movement mobilized the population into a series of 
industrialization, collectivization and economic modernization so as to boost the China‘s 
economy into surpassing developed economies.  Mega development projects, such as the 
TGP, were claimed as opportunities to provide a brighter future for the state to escape 
from the history of being weak and invaded
132
. The successful construction of these 
projects might indicate that the party state could bring about a powerful and prosperous 
prospect to the country. It is reasonable to conclude that the CCP would like to 
consolidate its legitimacy and show its great contribution in constructing a modernized 
and powerful China with the TGP
133
. 
The major features of the political context for the TGP in the 1980s were not 
confined to the legitimacy crisis of the party state. The technocratic nature of the party 
leadership was also another political circumstance to be considered. In Table 3.2, the 
academic backgrounds of the central leadership since 1989 are listed. It shows that the 
overwhelming majority of members from the PSC were well-educated and they have 
largely majored in engineering or technocratic disciplines.  
Table 3.2 – Academic Background of Leaders 
13th Standing Committee of 
the Politburo of the CCP 
(1989-1992) 
15th Standing Committee of the 
Politburo of the CCP (1997-
2002) 
17th Standing Committee of the 
Politburo of the CCP (2007-
Present) 
Name Education 
Background 
Name  Education 
Background 
Name  Education 
Background 
Jiang 
Zemin 
University 
Graduate, 
majoring 
electrical 
engineering, 
Shanghai Jiao 
Tong 
Jiang 
Zemin 
University 
Graduate, majoring 
electrical 
engineering, 
Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University, 
Hu Jintao University 
Graduate, 
Graduated from 
the specialty of 
hub hydropower 
stations of the 
Department of 
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University, 
Engineer 
Engineer Water 
Conservancy 
Engineering of 
Tsinghua 
University, 
Engineer 
Yao 
Yilin 
N/A Li Peng University 
Graduate, majoring 
in hydroelectric 
engineering,  
Moscow Power 
Engineering 
Institute, Senior 
Engineer 
Wu 
Bangguo 
University 
Graduate, the 
Department of 
Radio and 
Electronics of 
Tsinghua 
University, 
majoring in 
electronic vacuum 
devices., Engineer 
Song 
Ping 
University 
Graduate, 
Agricultural 
Faculty, 
Peking 
University, 
Revolutionary 
Leader 
Zhu 
Rongji 
University 
Graduate, majoring 
electrical 
engineering. 
Tsinghua 
University, 
Engineer 
Wen Jiabao University 
Graduate, Beijing 
Institute of 
Geology, 
majoring in 
geological 
structure, 
Engineer 
Qiao Shi University 
Graduate, 
Shanghai 
Tongji 
University, 
Revolutionary 
Leader 
Li 
Ruihuan 
Certificate 
Graduate, majoring 
industrial and 
civilian 
architecture, spare-
time architecture 
engineering 
institute, Carpenter 
Jia Qinglin University 
Graduate, the 
Department of 
Electric Power of 
Hebei 
Engineering 
College, majoring 
in electric motor 
and appliance 
design and 
manufacturing, 
Senior engineer 
Li Peng University 
Graduate, 
majoring in 
hydroelectric 
engineering,  
Moscow Power 
Engineering 
Institute, Senior 
Engineer 
Hu 
Jingtao 
University 
Graduate, 
Department of 
Water Conservancy 
Engineering of 
Tsinghua 
University,Engineer 
Li 
Changchun 
University 
Graduate, 
Department of 
Electric 
Machinery of 
Harbin Institute of 
Technology, 
majoring in 
industrial 
enterprise 
automation, 
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Engineer 
Li 
Ruihuan 
Certificate 
Graduate, 
majoring 
industrial and 
civilian 
architecture, 
Spare-time 
Architecture 
Engineering 
Institute, 
Carpenter 
Wei 
Jianxing 
University 
Graduate, majoring 
in mechanical 
engineering, 
Dailian University 
of Technology, 
Senior Engineer 
Xi Jinping University 
Graduate, 
Department of 
Water 
Conservancy 
Engineering of 
Tsinghua 
University, 
Engineer 
  Li 
Lanqing 
University 
Graduate, 
Department of 
Enterprise 
Management, 
Fudan University 
Li Keqiang University 
Graduate, the 
School of 
Economics of 
Peking 
University, 
majoring in 
economics, 
Doctor of 
Economic 
    He 
Guoqiang 
University 
Graduate, 
Inorganic 
Chemical 
Engineering 
Department, 
Beijing Institute 
of Chemical 
Engineering, 
majoring in 
inorganic 
engineering, 
Senior Engineer 
    Zhou 
Yongkang 
University 
Graduate, the 
Exploration 
Department, 
Beijing Petroleum 
Institute, majoring 
in geophysical 
exploration,Senior 
Engineer 
equivalent to 
Professor 
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Source: Website of PRC, [Internet] (accessed on 27 Jan 2010); available from 
http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-04/30/content_958850.htm ; Wikipedia; available from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politburo_Standing_Committee_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China 
The similar background of high-leveled officials implied intentions to rely on 
technologies for development. They were commonly known as ‗Red Specialists‘ 
(Hongshe Zhuanjia). Dai explained the resulting drawback of the overwhelming 
domination of technocrats in the leadership is the reckless decision to develop high 
technology by the state. In other words, high technological construction would become 
the most dominant method of economic and social development. In the meanwhile, it is 
less likely for them to consider the environment, ecology and humanitarian costs of 
developing high technological projects. Given that the technocratic party leadership 
encountered an arduous political environment associated with the June-Forth Massacre, 
they might further be motivated to launch the TGP.  
Implicitly, the TGP was a tool for safeguarding the interest of leaders and their 
families, especially Li Peng, who was the former Prime Minister in the early 1990s. Li 
was the largest supporter and driving force of the TGP in pushing for its approval in the 
decision making and planning. He repeatedly expressed his favourable stance for the 
project publicly. For instance, he ideologically justified the project by equating it to 
socialism‘s triumphs and praising it as a reflection of ‗the fighting spirit of the Chinese 
people and the superiority of the socialist system‘134.  However, once the involvement of 
his family in the power sector is included in the consideration, Li‘s motivation for 
driving the success of TGP might be questioned. His son is the president and his wife is 
a major shareholder of one of the largest state-owned power generating company – 
Huaneng Power. His daughter Li Xiaolin is also the vice manager of the China Power 
Investment Corporation. Huaneng Power is one of main shareholders of the China 
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Yangtze Power Corporation Limited (CYPC) which is the operator of hydroelectricity 
generation at the Three Gorges Dam
135
. Therefore Li‘s family was believed to have 
privately benefited from the TGP and the project was contemptuously referred to as ‗Li 
Peng‘s pet project‘136 . In some extents, this could also explain Li‘s enthusiasm for 
promoting the project and the autocratic decision making.  
Considering the unique political atmosphere in China after the Tiananmen 
Massacre, the composition of the leadership and even the implicit benefits to the leaders 
and their families, the intoxication of the party leadership for the TGP could be 
uncovered and explained. TGP, in the eyes of the leaders, is not only a necessary means 
of economic development for the state, but also a tool of expanding their political power 
and ensuring their private interests
137
. It could reasonably explain the oppressive 
presence and attitude of the autocratic central government in the decision-making 
process of the TGP. In China, criticisms against the project have been close to ‗taboo‘ 
and they would be strictly repressed by the authorities. This implies an up-to-down 
decision-making approach of the TGP in which the central leadership becomes the sole 
decision maker of the implementation of the project, while the SOEs, ministries, 
provincial governments and other bureaucratic organs were just instruments of the 
implementation. Nevertheless, the decision making process seems to be more 
complicated than the leadership-oriented approach. In addition, despite the tendency of 
approving the project in an up-to-down approach, this did not mean that consensus was 
easy to achieve in the central and even leadership level.  
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 In retrospect, the controversies of the TGP had achieved another high point in the 
early 1980s. The famous Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, aggressively promoted a series 
of economic and social reforms so as to encourage modernization of the country. Similar 
to Mao, Deng believed that a great leap forward in the modernization of hydroelectricity 
would consolidate social modernization in economic reforms. Therefore, he was 
seemingly quite determined to launch the TGP so as to deal with the necessity of 
hydroelectricity generation, flood control and navigation in the late 1970s; although the 
central leadership did not completely achieve the consensus of launching the project in 
spite of Deng‘s determination. According to Li, Chen Yun and Zhao Ziyang showed 
reservations to the project. Zhao, who would shortly be the Sichuan provincial leader 
and then the Prime Minister of China, showed his anxiety for the considerable amount of 
land which would be inundated and people to be resettled due to the project. Chen, the 
‗economic Tsar‘ and another important eminent leader of the CCP, questioned the 
financial and administrative abilities of the party to launching the gigantic TGP 
aggressively before 1990s
138
. However, Chen and Zhao were cautious in proposing their 
opposition. Chen approached Li Rui who was a major opponent in China and allied with 
him to write a series of documents criticizing the proposal of TGP from the Ministry of 
Water Conservancy, to request the leadership to be more deliberative on for the 
project
139
. The significant reservation of Chen and Zhao made the decision of launching 
TGP in the early 1980s unrealistic. Moreover, cleavages of opinions amongst other 
leaders also became more apparent.  
 Owing to the lack of consensus among the leadership, ministries, departments 
and state-owned enterprises, opinion at the central level remained fragmented towards 
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the project. The common ground among relevant ministries and departments was their 
perception of Deng‘s advocacy of the project, so they tended not to directly challenge 
Deng‘s instruction. Nevertheless, in order to obstruct any reckless and rapid 
implementation, opposing agencies suggested having a slower pace of implementation 
via a variety of methods. For instance, the separation of the Ministry of Water 
Conservancy and Electric Power into the Ministry of Water Conservancy and the 
Ministry of Electric Power in 1979 reflected inter-ministry controversy towards the 
project. The Ministry of Water Conservancy was one of the major supporters for the 
project and enthusiastically promoted the approval of the TGP proposal as soon as 
possible. Unfortunately, they disputed with the Ministry of Electric Power because of 
repeated arguments on the priorities and details of the project, such as investments, 
administrative supervision and processes
140
. The reorganization of the Ministry of Water 
Conservancy and Electric Power led to the surfacing of this ‗in-house‘ argument within 
the ministry and even in the State Council. Additionally, although it would like to 
prevent direct contests against paramount leader, central authorities might dispute the 
technological problems and details so as to slow the pace of getting approval for the 
project.  
 In short, due to its inheritance of the traditional up-to-down approach in the 
Leninist socialist bureaucratic system, the central leadership had provided the core 
dynamic for the approval of the TGP. However, the cleavages of opinions amongst the 
leadership reflected the difficulties of successful implementation of dam construction. 
Further, the cleavages were not confined to within the leadership; it extended to 
ministries and departments of the central government. Accordingly, the project was not 
substantially approved throughout the 1980s until the Tiananmen Massacre. Since the 
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Massacre, the political environment, particularly in the central level, experienced a great 
change. For example, leadership became more autocratic and more technocratic officials 
entered the leadership. Thus, dam construction was praised as the most triumphant 
instrument of social and economic modernization. TGP was thereby approved, albeit 
with the existence of a number of unsolved problems and questions. 
The Centre in the NRP – Indifferent but Critical Referee 
Central Direction & Manipulation of Political Economy 
  In contrast, the attitude of the central leadership in the NRP was not as eager as 
in the TGP. The most obvious participation of the central leadership throughout the 
decision-making process of NRP was through the instruction of suspending the 
implementation of NRP and the leadership ‗cautiously studied, and scientifically 
decided‘ it141. The presence of the central leaders in the project, to a large extent, implies 
intervening policies of local development in provinces, rather than simple suspension. 
Yardley even described that this instruction ‗signals that China‘s top leaders have not a 
plan that most dam opponents had considered a fait accompli‘142. In other words, Wen‘s 
order reflected that the implicit political cleavages between the centre and locals, which 
gives space to environmental protection activists to lobby their interests in order to shape 
policy making process; something which is rare in the Chinese bureaucratic system. 
Nevertheless, the suspension could not thereby be concluded that the central leadership 
either would like to degrade the priority of developing hydroelectricity or that it has lost 
its bargaining power with social organizations. Therefore, prior to analyzing the 
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interactive mechanism from the central perspective, a number of pre-depositions should 
be clarified and explained.  
 First, notwithstanding the rapid economic growth in the last decade of the 20
th
 
century, the Chinese government put significant efforts towards maintaining a high-
growth economy. Economic growth and development has never been out of the agenda 
of central leadership. In the 11
th
 Five-Year-Plan, the new leadership expressed its vision 
of constructing a more diversified energy sector beyond consuming fossil fuels and 
hydroelectricity through ‗administrative means‘143. Apparently, ‗development‘ is still 
dominating the high priority of leaders, but they are concerned and thus mentioned the 
importance of environment more frequently than their predecessors. Subsequently, it is 
more likely for the new leadership to be deliberating dam construction projects. 
 The leverage of market mechanism, then, has penetrated a vital position in the 
Chinese bureaucratic system since the reform period. It is believed that the Chinese 
political system has transited from traditional socialist hierarchy to a more liberal and 
modernized system. The FA model argued and highlighted the transition of dynamics of 
bureaucratic apparatus from vertical relationship (i.e. chief-subordinate relationship) to a 
more ‗market-oriented‘ and ‗rule-guided‘ one 144 . Therefore, policies have become 
considerably more utilitarian. The implementation of recent policies does not only rely 
on central commands, but also on market contribution to the policies, although the 
central authorities  are still ‗holding back on giving freer rein to market mechanisms and 
using tighter administrative controls to monitor the economy in general
145‘. For example, 
a number of SOEs have been privatized in a certain extent since the 1990s, so profit 
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seeking and efficiency have become major objectives for SOEs in expanding the 
business scale. Market mechanism acted mere prominently in the polity and has 
encouraged the bureaucratic apparatus to awaken their political and administrative 
interests. As a result, the cleavage amongst central ministries becomes more apparent 
and the NRP is a good example to illustrate this phenomenon.  
 Although the central authorities have emphasized the significance of developing 
hydroelectricity as a grand strategy, central ministries were not unified for the dam; with 
the NRP significantly reflecting this phenomenon. The National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) approved and supported the project with the initial 
schedule of the dam taken from the proposal presented to State Council for final 
approval and construction to commence in September, 2003. However, the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA)
146
 criticized the project and published 
an article against the construction of the NRP
147
. The large inconsistency among 
ministries in the central authorities contributed to the postponement of the approval, and 
thus activists had room to fight for re-consideration of the project after the enforcement 
of the law. Further, ministries informally worked with organizations and localities in 
accordance with their diverse interests. The subsequently agglomerate behaviors were 
similar to two adverse coalitions which commonly aimed to influence the decision of the 
central leadership. Graph 3.3 shows the structure and linkages of these two coalitions.  
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Graph 3.3 – The Campaign and its Institutional Setting in the NRP 
 
Source: Graph 2 in Michael Busgen, NGOs and the Search for Chinese Civil Society Environmental Non-
Governmental Organizations in the Nujiang Campaign, (Feb, 2006), [E-working paper] available from 
http://cendoc.esan.edu.pe/fulltext/e-documents/ISS-NL/wp422.pdf (accessed on 30 Nov., 2009), 28. 
 
They were organized into two campaigns in accordance with their stance for/against the 
NRP; therefore, their stances were portrayed as ‗adversaries‘ in this contest of interest, 
with the supporting side led by the Huadian hydropower Corporation and the provincial 
government. However, the anti-dam coalition was the major dynamic in the campaign.  
For the supporting side, ministries and localities argued that the mega-project 
could develop the infrastructure of the Nu River region, which is the most remote and 
poverty-stuck region in China. Due to the geographical constraints, the Nu River region 
has rarely attracted capital to invest. Additionally, indigenous people in this region are 
mainly ethnic minority and poorly educated; hence, it is more difficult for them to be 
alleviated from poverty. Hydro-electricity which is perceived as a type of ‗clean‘ power 
supply, could effectively resolve these two constraints of development
148
. From the 
graph, the processes of initiation of the project are shown; however, the graph does not 
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show the efforts of the supporting coalition to lobby its interest. For instance, they 
gathered local intellectuals who mainly stand for the project and had a meeting in 
Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan province, allowing their views and arguments to be 
publicized by local newspapers in the spring of 2003
149
. Also, the local government 
further justified the project with the promotion of responding to the ‗Open up the West‘ 
Campaign. Moreover, due to the mightiness of the NDRC in the bureaucratic systems, 
the supporting coalitions seemed to be in advantage of this campaign, as they were 
seemingly giving the impression of having greater influence on the central leadership.  
In effect, the central leadership, through its mighty authority in determining the 
success or failure of the project, is the only referee of the project whose responsibilities 
are providing the final approval and coordinating work with other relevant departments 
or ministries, such as SEPA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc. Subsequently, the 
central leadership seems to have no absolute stance on the NRP. However, some central 
ministries or commissions, like NDRC and Huadian, etc, would stand favourably for the 
project because of their policy interests. The NDRC which aims to balance the economic 
and social development of the whole country has a similar vision to the provincial 
government and believes that the project would benefit residents in the reservoir area 
through a better material livelihood. Thus, it might also hope that electricity generated 
from the NRP could be sent to the coastal regions for consumption
150
. Unfortunately, 
electricity companies such as Huadian are more likely to participate in developing 
hydroelectricity simply because there is an enormous amount of cheap electricity to be 
sold. Thus, it agreed to establish the Yunnan Huadian Nujiang River Hydropower 
Development Co. Ltd (YHNHD) with the Yunnan Provincial government and its 
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investment corporation in 2003. Referring to Table 3.5, the Huadian Corporation is the 
largest shareholder of the YHNHD, and it was reported that Huadian estimated Yunnan 
provincial government could gain a 1.3 billion yuan annual return
151
. The considerable 
profit from hydropower development resulted in Huadian becoming aggressive and 
active in arguing for the implementation of the NRP, and this also explains why the 
provincial government was an important proponent of the project.  
Table 3.5 – Allocation of Share of YHNHD 
Name of Enterprise Shareholders Proportion of Share 
Huadian Corporation 51% 
Yunnan Investment Group 20% 
Yunnan Electric Group Hydropower 
Construction Ltd. 
19% 
Nujiang River Electricity Company 10% 
Source: Tong Zhifang, ‗Structure of Mobilization and Development of Natural Protection Movement – 
Case Study in Nujiang River Anti-dam Movement‘ (Dongyuan Jiegou yu Zhiran Baoyu Yundong de 
fazhan – yi Nujiang Fanba Yundong weili), Open Times (Kaifang Shidai)207 (Sep, 2009): 118 
Nonetheless, some ministries do not seem to devote time and resources to dam 
construction, except state-owned electricity companies. However, the NDRC are 
apparently less devoted to the NRP, because it also considers the potential social issues, 
such as resettlement, social unrests and corruption which are associated with the launch 
of these types of projects. Different to the past, NDRC seemed to consider other aspects 
on this economic development; therefore, it is not surprising that NDRC is more 
deliberating with regards to the NRP. 
 In contrast, the weaker SEPA needed to forgo more effort to shape the policy 
making. The embarrassing position of ministries which stood against the project such as 
SEPA is noteworthy. On the one hand, they should maintain the unified images of the 
decision in the ‗collective‘ centre, and on the other, they need to fight to achieve their 
interests in the policy. They failed to work directly with social organizations and 
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individual activists, yet they obstructed the supporting coalitions as they possessed a 
huge amount of empirical data which seemed to disadvantage the project and the 
centre‘s strong legitimacy in the public domain 152 . Also, they uphold the unique 
environmental value of the Nujiang region and demonstrate how the NRP contradicted 
the objectives of reserving the Sanjiang Binliu. Apart from educating and persuading 
potential individuals who were to be relocated in the project, they also informally allied 
with ENGOs to put pressure on the central leadership to suspend the NRP
153
. In order to 
pressure the leadership effectively, environmental agencies also stirred up nationwide 
controversy about the project, in raising the arguments of how the project is 
incompatible with the new environmental law which came into forced in September 
2003
154
. All works of the opposition proposed to call on the concerns of the public, 
especially in specific issues such as resettlement, environmental damage and social 
equality. Subsequently, they seemed to have become major obstacles that the provincial 
government needed to overcome in order to complete the project.  
On the other hand, the supporting authorities were not willing to blindly 
demonstrate their favor to the project, even if the project could bring a huge amount of 
economic benefit to the organs themselves. Thus, they delegated some important 
responsibilities, such as promoting the project to the public, legitimatizing the necessity 
of the project, and even constructing precise content in the plan of the project to the local 
governments. Yet, the centre would still act as the largest investor for a range of dam 
construction projects, but the procedure of capital injection needed to be more rigorous. 
According to Ma Jun, Director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, the 
centre would not inject any capital into projects until they were ‗unquestionably 
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approved‘155. In other words, the centre wanted more deliberation over dam construction 
so as to achieve the balance of economic development and environmental protection.  
The ‗Open up the West‘ campaign in 1999 aims to narrow down the income 
disparity between this region and the coastal region. The campaign is an opportunity of 
change and development for Yunnan which is at the most South-western end of the 
territory and one of the resource-richest provinces in China. However, the lengthy 
history of being inferior and destitute led to great ambition of the Yunnan provincial 
government to improve the economic performance and it proposed diverse tactics of 
poverty relief
156
. The Nu River Project is one of the major projects purposed for 
achieving this goal by the Yunnan government. Nevertheless, comments of the central 
government seemed to be less fascinated of the dam construction. Subsequently, the 
NRP from the leadership seems to be more neutral, especially after considering the 
environmental and ecological damages that the project will bring. The decision of the 
necessity of NRP, according to Mertha, was made in 1999 by the NDPC. The Huadian 
Group, which is one of the largest state-owned electricity enterprises in China, was a 
major developer and operator of the TGP and took part in the project four years later
157
. 
However, despite their participation, their efforts in promoting the project seemed to be 
mentioned less throughout the controversy of the project.  
In the meantime, civil society might act as a check-and-balance mechanism to 
the increasingly mighty local governments, and rather than mere critics against national 
reform
158
. Social organizations may thus be responsible in mitigating drawbacks derived 
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from these problems. For opponents, SOs are faithful and mighty allies to reshape public 
opinions towards the project. In the case of the NRP, civic groups highlighted a blind 
spot in the midst of the policy which the authorities might neglect, and they questioned 
the project and its incompatibility with the new environmental law. In addition, their 
additional information gained from assessing the project gave the SEPA an ability to 
argue against the project. The opponent apparatus and social organizations 
coincidentally had delineation of responsibilities. Environmental social organizations, 
which were against dam construction, made enormous contributions to constructing and 
broadening horizontal networks of opposition campaigns; opponent ministries, on the 
other hand, due to the help of particularly outstanding cadres inside, could amplify the 
opposition voices against the project while there was no consensus within central 
government
159
. A de facto alliance was formed between a part of central authorities and 
social organizations; This de facto alliance proved to be effective in shaping the policy 
making process of China and altering the consequence of unpopular decisions. Beyond a 
direct contest with the authorities, they recognized the bureaucratic cleavages and 
‗support [of] one department to oppose another,‘160 thus, the differentiation of policy 
interests amongst ministries and commissions is the core dynamic of maintaining the 
cohesiveness of the organization. In spite of the successful experience of altering the 
result of the NRP, it is not sufficient to conclude that the alliance of social organizations 
and central authorities was well-established and institutionalized.  
In short, after analyzing the political contexts and circumstances of the central 
leadership and bureaucratic organs at the central level, in the decision making periods of 
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the TGP and NRP, one may conclude that the central leadership seems to be the most 
determinant actor throughout the decision making processes. Nonetheless, the strategies, 
actions and responsibilities of the central leadership were demonstrated to have 
undergone significant transformation. In the following section, rationales of these 
transformations will be explained and the correlation of personnel transformation and 
these transformations will be analyzed. It is argued that the transformation of the notion 
of ‗development‘ in the mindset of central leaders, and in particular the Prime Minister, 
exists and influences the success of mega projects, such as TGP and NRP. In spite of the 
great determination of the central leadership, the leverage seemed to, in the meantime, 
be restrained by the fragmented bureaucracy. Additionally, the interest fragmentation 
amongst agencies had become more distinct and apparent, so the restrains of central 
leadership had thereby become more embarrassing. It constructed solid obstruction and 
procrastination towards successful implementation of policy. Therefore, in order to deal 
with the situation and allocate agencies‘ interests more impartially, the central leadership 
tends to deliberate or passively shelve the NRP proposal instead of seeking consensus 
among agencies.  
Transformation of Leadership & Change of Attitude? 
Comparing analyses of these two projects from the perspective of the central 
leadership, one might conclude that the attitude of central leaders towards dams have 
evolved to be more deliberating. However, this conclusion is not sufficient to explain the 
scope of evolution since it concentrates on a part of it. The personnel succession in this 
decade should be included in analyses since the rationales of policy formulation in the 
central leadership have changed continuously. The table 3.6 has indicated these 
transformations.  
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Table 3.6 – Evolvement of Rationales of Agenda Setting and Policy Formulation for 
Central Leadership 
 13
th
 Standing 
Committee of the 
Politburo of the CCP 
(1989-1992) 
15
th
 Standing 
Committee of the 
Politburo of the CCP 
(1997-2002) 
17
th
 Standing 
Committee of the 
Politburo of the CCP 
(2002-2007) 
Instructional 
Ideological 
Slogun(s) 
‗Reform for interior, 
Opening for 
exterior‘ (duinei 
gaige, duiwai 
kaifang) 
Three 
Representatives of 
CCP 
‗Scientific 
Development‘ & 
‗Harmonious Society‘ 
Considerations of 
Agenda Setting 
 Sustainability or 
reinforcement of 
political 
legitimacy of 
CCP
161
 
 Stable personnel 
succession of the 
leadership 
 Sustainability of 
rapid economic 
growth
162
 
 Reinforcing the 
reliability and 
efficiency of the 
government and 
economy 
 Success of 
economic 
liberalization, 
e.g. privatization 
of SOEs, 
Financial 
Reforms, WTO 
accession, etc
163
. 
 Disparities and 
injustice in the 
society due to 
economic 
liberalization 
 Drawbacks of 
globalization, e.g. 
economic 
instability, etc.
164
 
 Serious rent-
seeking activities 
and bribery in the 
hierarchy
165
 
Governance Style  Repressive 
leadership and 
weak opposition 
 Ideological 
embellishment 
 Strong and 
repressive 
economic & 
bureaucratic 
reforms
166
 
 Showing to close 
to the 
grassroots
167
 
 Strong pragmatic 
image and 
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of policies 
 
 Mighty central 
government to 
consolidate 
mechanisms 
entrepreneur-
liked style
168
 
Background of 
Power Possession 
 1989 Tiananmen 
Massacre & 
wave of 
democratization 
in Soviet Union 
hampering the 
legitimacy of the 
CCP
169
 
 Great anxiety of 
economic 
liberalization in 
the leadership 
(e.g. Deng‘s tour 
in the Southern 
China in 1992)  
 Reinforcing the 
pace of 
economic 
growth in high 
speed 
  Rapid economic 
growth and 
serious social 
legacies 
 
 Successful WTO 
accession and 
related economic 
reforms
170
 
 Emergence of the 
necessity of 
social policies
171
 
 Waves of 
collective 
incidents and 
anti-bureaucratic 
activities  
throughout the 
whole country
172
 
 
In 2002, the CCP experienced another personnel transformation of the central leadership 
after the 16
th
 National Congress. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao became the President and 
the Prime Minister to replace Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji respectively. This personnel 
transformation represented an evolution of political philosophy of the administration, 
and especially the attitude towards dam construction. According to the table 3.6, the 
leadership devoted actively for industrialization and modernization, especially Zhu 
Rongji who stressed the bureaucratic reforms and enhancement of efficiency in the 
economy and bureaucracy, so they were seemingly favour of dam construction. 
Surprisingly, despite their common background of being well-educated in engineering 
disciplines, the Hu-Wen administration – unlike their predecessors – claimed to be 
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indifferent to hydroelectricity development
173
. The new-coming administration did not 
deny the importance of energy supply for the development of the economy, but it had 
been more indifferent to the necessity of dam construction – especially gigantic projects 
such as TGP – and to the diversification of energy supply. This change could be evinced 
by the increasing stress of wind, solar and other renewables rather than hydroelectricity, 
in the 11
th
 Five-Year Plan of China. Moreover, the low-profile celebration for 
completion of the TGP queerly contrasted the heavy efforts of embellishment of 
justifying the project by the previous administration
174
. The value of hydroelectricity in 
the central leadership was thereby believed to be delegated more deliberately.  
Prior to the succession of Hu and Wen, Heggelund suggested this argument in 
2001. He especially concentrated on the transformation of premiership and exemplified 
with diverse orientations between Li Peng to Zhu Rongji so as to demonstrate the 
transformation of political attitude towards the leadership in relation to dam construction. 
Li who was the Prime Minister of the State Council during the late 1980s and early 
1990s was a prominent supporter of dam construction. Apart from proposing the TGP, 
he also became one of the important defenders of the project. Zhu was more critical of 
the project. Instead of directly criticizing the validity of the project, Zhu allowed mass 
media and commentators to highlight significant problems encountered in the project
175
. 
In the previous section, the critical position of the central leadership in policy making 
processes of both projects has been identified. The supreme determinacy of leadership is 
not only the consequence of the hierarchal superiority of leadership, but also its 
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possession of information and professional knowledge
176
. Leaders, assisted by think 
tanks and consultative intellectuals, might be able to achieve consensus among various 
bureaucratic apparatus and to produce rational and qualified decisions
177
. Moreover, he 
also argued that the improvement of academic backgrounds of leaders might probably 
evolve the orientation of decision making to be more realistic and pragmatic.  
During the policy planning of TGP, the central leadership was more autocratic 
and dynamical to the successful implementation of the project despite occasional 
hesitations from the leaders. Mass media, bureaucratic apparatus and state-owned 
enterprises were main agents that implemented policies and followed leaders without 
any challenge. Thus, policies were criticized to be of poor quality and ‗going out of 
shape‘ (zou yang le)178 ; yet, any unfavorable reports were prohibited in China. In 
addition, ideological slogans and propaganda were still being utilized to mobilize people 
and civil society to commit to the project and comfort the discontent of resettlers. 
Subsequently, at the beginning of the policy making process, the media played the role 
of ‗guiding public opinion‘ towards the project179. However, the quality of policies was 
not guaranteed and civilians, in particular resettled people in the project, were victimized. 
For example, it was reported that thousands of rural migrants had moved back to their 
lands because they were struggling with local people after relocating to other 
provinces
180
. Besides, researchers were questioned as to the accuracy of official data and 
estimates about the project. The World Bank accelerated the estimated total number of 
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resettlers to be 1.4 million because the Chinese official estimates did not include 
secondary resettlers and figures were underestimated using the Hukou system
181
.  
The autocratic method of implementation changed to one that was more 
transparent and realistic during Zhu and Wen‘s premierships, with more realistic news 
and even scandals discovered in the midst of their tenures. Heggelund cited the 
publication of four articles of the People‘s Daily – the tongue post (mouth piece) of the 
CCP – which called on the leadership to be concerned the different issues raised by the 
project. This reflects the gradual release of the party‘s grip in manipulating the mass 
media in relation to the TGP. As a result, Zhu‘s transparency was highly praised, and 
there was one comment that 
‗[i]f it were not for Zhu Rongji, it would be impossible to 
show the state of affairs for the project.
182‘ 
On the other hand and in the case of the NRP, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced 
that he was going to suspend the project in response to fierce controversies in society, 
and the policy making process seems to have been more transparent. In addition to the 
diversification of policy interests among central authorities, the process had even 
become more transparent and free for expression. For instance, the public hearing by the 
SEPA in November 2005 is rare in authoritarian China, as to have such open platform to 
collect public opinion is not usual practice
183
.  
 Heggelund explained the difference of orientation in the central leadership that  
‗[a] main difference between the revolutionary 
leaders of the first and second generations and the 
technocrats of the third generation (i.e. Leadership 
led by Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji) is that they are 
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problem-solvers by training; ―they focus on 
problems, not ‗isms‘184.  
 
The transformation of central leadership contributed to a well-educated and pragmatic 
leadership, and may thus lead to an intention for resolving and preventing problems. 
Thus, this might explain why the central leadership seems to be more deliberating and 
indifferent to gigantic dam construction projects. 
 Although the technocratic trend of the leadership, the rapid transformation of 
political background of power possession in this decade brought more diverse agenda 
setting of the central leadership. Referring to the table 3.6 (sees p.71-72), the 
concentration of the central leadership in agenda setting has gone beyond economic 
development and included a series of social issues in the grand strategy, such as, anti-
bribery, environmental protection and social justice, for the Hu-Wen administration. 
Enormous dam construction was viewed to deteriorate social problems and challenge the 
governance of the CCP. Thus, the central leadership has evolved to be more indifferent 
for large-scale hydro-electricity project.  
 In short, after analyzing the TGP and NRP from the centre‘s perspective, one 
might contrast the political significance of TGP and NRP which seems to be one of the 
main reasons contributing to the diverse consequences of these two projects. However, 
the TGP should not only be regarded as a pure economic project, as it was highly praised 
by leaders due to its unique historical values and the arduous political atmosphere in 
China after the June-Fourth Massacre. As a consequence, the TGP could become a 
symbol of modernization and technological advancement in contemporary China which 
may consolidate the legitimacy of CCP. On the contrary, the political significance of 
NRP does not seem to be as high as the TGP in the central perspective, especially after 
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the anxiety over environmental and ecological problems had resurfaced. Moreover, the 
central authorities have been pluralized in accordance with diverse policy interests, so 
the NRP was easily obstructed and challenged. Beyond the approach of assessing the 
legitimacy of the project, this chapter has demonstrated and analyzed the contextual 
actions of the central leadership and authorities in the TGP and the NRP. Cleavages of 
interests existed in the central government, in both leadership and ministries. Further, 
this seems to correlate with the scope of economic liberalization. On the other hand, the 
higher level that leaders had possessed did not only lead to technocratic tendencies in 
decision making, but also explained the rationales of deliberation before decisions were 
reached by the new-generation central leadership. Nevertheless, the significant 
transformation is not restrained at the intra-bureaucratic level, but exists in the centre-
periphery relationship. In the following chapter, the correlations of decentralization and 
interest fragmentation inside the hierarchical system in China will be explained.  
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Chapter 4 – Local Officials and Mega Hydropower Project: Transformation 
of Interest Articulation 
 The extensive domain of China has caused huge diversity of environment 
amongst provinces. Taking Yunnan and Hubei provinces, where the Nu River Dams and 
Three Gorges Dam are respectively located, even though they are both inland provinces, 
Yunnan province is inferior to Hubei in terms of economic performance; however it has 
richer reserves in a range of natural resources and its relief is relatively mountainous. 
Moreover, Yunnan is more ethnically diverse than other provinces. The huge diversity 
of provinces thus enables local officials to sound legitimate when taking part in the 
important role of policy formulation. This is because, local officials, particularly 
provincial cadres, have greater political leverage than constitutional regulations. They 
shoulder responsibilities of implementing policies, planning directions, and strategizing 
development. In this chapter, not only will actions of provincial governments in these 
projects be introduced, how localities regard mega dam projects like TGP and NRP will 
also be discussed. The rationales of their praises towards these projects will also be 
analyzed from the perspective of local bureaucrats. Thus, how these notions influenced 
expectations and interactions with the central agencies and civil society are of concern 
here. Moreover, this chapter will argue that market mechanism and local 
developmentalism in the local governments, rather than ideology, have penetrated into 
the calculations of local cadres. Ideology seems to have become only an instrument for 
local cadres in achieving their goals, hence this chapter aims to support and even enrich 
the applicability of the FA model. 
 Before going into the analysis of this chapter, the level of investigation should be 
clearly delineated. In the contemporary Chinese polity, there are three main stories of 
local-level echelon: provinces, townships/cities/prefectures and village/district levels. 
Throughout this thesis, local governments generally refer to public administrative 
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institutions in provincial and prefecture levels and correspondent cadres. Organs in 
several autonomous areas, such as Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet and 
Xinjiang, also have an identical administrative position in political system of China. The 
majority of cadres in these levels are positioned through the promotion, deployment or 
recruitment of the extensive party membership. Moreover, different from the elected 
village-level cadres, provincial and prefecture-level cadres seem to have a brighter 
prospect and future of promotion to the central leadership
185
. For instance, both 
President Hu Jintao and Vice President Xi Jinping have rich experience of working as 
general secretaries in provincial party committees
186
. Additionally, regardless of the 
patterns in power distribution, the provincial government‘s role cannot be eliminated187 
and it is viewed as having an identical ranking with ministries in the centre. As a result, 
a governor in a province will generally have a similar status with a minister of the centre 
in Chinese administrative hierarchical system
188
. Thus, their interactions and 
expectations with civil society and central agencies are main foci of this chapter.  
 Due to the diverse geographical and cultural varieties of these provinces, the 
central government failed to implement economic policies with absolute uniformity. 
Local governments were gradually allowed to implement a range of economic policies 
in their willingness to boost the economies of their domains. Decentralization of 
authority altered responsibilities and relationships between the centre and peripheries.  
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Further, it also implies the provision of a platform for local officials to have greater 
political leverage, as they are no longer mere agents of the centre who will stick to its 
directions and guidelines as many of them were in 1950s. Lieberthal uncovered the 
reality of the degradation of power that ‗[a]lthough Beijing (i.e. the centre) retains 
important resources to bring provinces to heel, provincial leaders often evade orders that 
are not quite specific and are not given high priority by the national leaders
189.‘ Li 
elaborated the situation as 
‗[r]ather than merely responding to central 
demands, provincial leaders mobilized substantial 
resources for their own use. Their lower status in 
the state hierarchy might have made them the 
weaker partner of the bargaining relationship with 
the Centre. However, despite the disparity in 
theoretical power, the provinces have shown 
themselves to have no small measure of power in 
their own right
190
.‘ 
Thus seen, provincial leaders also enjoyed the authority of economic policies 
formulation, and they could initiate policies in accordance with their own interests and 
visions. Besides, they have also been able to ‗influence national policy informally 
through their reactions to central directive‘191. However, this may not represent the 
deterioration of the authority of the central leadership.  
 The emphasis of economic and social development in the post-Mao period has 
highlighted an imbalanced domination of economic development in the agenda of 
provincial leaders. From their viewpoint, mega dam projects are opportunities to attract 
capital injection for the provinces beyond improving infrastructure facilities in the 
domain. Particularly in the cases of TGP and NRP, reservoir areas in these projects are 
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located in poverty-struck regions of China. Thus, local leaders frequently claimed that 
the projects and their respective resettlement campaigns could encourage the economies 
and to develop, or indeed improve environment and accessibility of these regions; in 
other words, mega project were viewed as a way of poverty alleviation. This chapter will 
investigate how these projects were considered by localities as means to develop 
economies of their paddocks.                                                                                     
Localities in TGP – enforcement and specific decision 
 Since fiscal decentralization in the reform era, provincial leaders were 
enthusiastic of developing industrial levels within their paddocks. As an illustration, it 
was reported that some provincial governments imposed ‗protectionist policies‘ on 
‗inter-provincial trade‘ in order to protect their industries and economies192. The great 
and mercantilist enthusiasm of provincial leaders uncovered interest and political clashes 
between provinces. Thus, mega projects such as the TGP, in the perspective of local 
officials, could not be simply regarded as economic policy alone. This is because they 
would be an arena of bargaining for leaders to lobby, amplify, and fight for interests of 
various provinces as well as their own. Therefore, this could reflect increasing interest 
differentiation between provinces. In Graph 4-1, the structure of governmental 
institutions that was adopted in TGP management is shown and provincial governments 
were responsible for institutionalizing, planning and managing resettlement. They need 
to coordinate resource, workload and responsibility allocation amongst local 
governments at the lower level. Besides, in order to facilitate the completion of the 
project, local governments mobilized state-owned enterprises and township-village 
enterprises in their domains in order to invest in reservoir area. For instance, Zigui 
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county and Badong county, which are located in Hubei province and encountered 
resettlement on a similar scale, offered tax exemption. Also, Zigui even offered the 
return of added-value tax to enterprises in order to tempt more capital investment in 
different industries of the local economies
193
. As a consequence, this section will 
concentrate on the realm that provincial governments were involved with the most: 
resettlement
194
. 
Resettlement Campaign 
Resettlement was portrayed as the most difficult and complicated part of the 
entire TGP campaign
195
, and local governments generally acted as agents to follow and 
actualize the vision and planning of the centre in the project. According to Graph 4-1, 
local governments shouldered the responsibilities of planning, managing and inspecting 
the relocation process of the project, as well as establish relevant administrative organs 
which specialized in handling all issues incurred in the relocation campaign. The project 
could thus be eventually completed on time. Also, due to the simultaneity of 
resettlement and construction works, as well as the significant relocation population, the 
difficulties of resettlement were accelerated. However, responsibilities of provinces 
would substantially vary according to the flow of individuals relocating. For instance, 
the reservoir provinces and the host provinces‘ responsibilities were substantially 
different. Referring to Graph 4-1 (sees p.98), the State Council would oversee the whole 
project while provincial governments would be responsible for managing the flow of 
resettlement. Nevertheless, for reservoir provinces, i.e. Chongqing-Sichuan and Hubei, 
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they would manage the distribution of compensation to resettlers and also mobilize 
affected residents. For the host provinces, they were in charge of receiving relocatees 
and provided inter-provincial investments to reservoir area. The differentiation in 
substantial responsibilities amongst provinces led to the fragmentation of stances for the 
TGP amongst provinces.  
Sichuan was a good example of not favoring the TGP. The opposition was the 
consequence of considering the inundation area of reservoir area and the considerable 
cost of resettlement. Before the elevation of Chongqing‘s administrative status in 1997, 
provincial leaders in Chengdu were afraid to shoulder too heavy burden of resettlements, 
and other development projects in the province would most probably be influenced or 
even suspended
196
. As a result, Sichuan‘s enthusiasm for the project was apparently 
conditional and limited. Provincial officials were subsequently enthusiastic towards 
supporting and preparing the proposal for a lower dam in the initial stage of the project 
planning
197
. The high dam would bring about a larger reservoir area and more people 
would thereby be relocated, so the burden of Chengdu might be heavier. Nonetheless, it 
was reported that a new administrative entity would be created out of Sichuan and would 
bear the responsibilities for resettlement, instead of Sichuan
198
. The stance of Sichuan 
seemed to be softened and, in the end, Chongqing and the suburb around was escalated 
into a municipality in 1997, which is tantamount to provincial level
199
. 
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Lampton argued that the political process was the consequence of lengthy 
consultation and negotiation amongst bureaucratic organs, rather the simple and 
unilateral command from the central leadership
200
. For example, notwithstanding the 
strong enthusiasm of completing the TGP from the central leadership, localities were not 
fully willing to follow the centre with absolute compliance. This was because the fiscal 
decentralization allowed provincial governments to develop their own economic policies 
without the centre‘s approval. Provincial leaders focused on economic development of 
provinces that they serve rather than of the whole country, or other provinces, when they 
decided the strategies of economic development of the provinces. Accordingly, there 
were confrontational strategies amongst provinces. The strategy differentiation might 
imply interest fragmentation amongst provinces albeit the common target of developing 
local economies. On the other hand, the economic liberalization awakened the 
perception of departmental interests of bureaucrats, and most probably clash with 
localities‘ strategy of economic development. This differentiation brought apparent 
cleavages in the decision making between the centre and the peripheries such as in 
Sichuan‘s case. Subsequently, it was necessary for the centre to coordinate the diverse 
interests of provinces and to bargain with provincial leaders in order to achieve 
consensus in the hierarchy. Therefore, it sought to have an efficient decision making but 
the time of to make political decision would be lengthened
201
. Referring to Sichuan‘s 
anxiety in TGP, Chongqing‘s escalation from prefectural to municipal level in 1997, 
which is directly administrated by the centre and enjoys the identical echelon of 
provinces in the hierarchal system of China, was viewed as an instrument of seeking for 
agreement to high-meter dam construction from Chengdu.
202
. Eventually, Sichuan 
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became another host province responsible for absorbing distant resettlers from the 
reservoir area. 
On the other hand, the great challenge of resettlement that was brought to the 
project was not only the vast population of affected people, but also in essence the 
uprooting of livelihoods and high risk impoverishment. In addition, tragedies in Chinese 
resettlement history highlighted the significance of resettlement.
203
 As a result, the 
center proposed regulations and policies of development-oriented resettlement in order 
to promise the maintenance of resettlers‘ livelihoods after relocation. This was presented 
in the official regulations for resettlement campaigns, issued in 2001:  
‗[i]n the Three Gorges Project construction, the 
development-oriented residents-resettlement 
guideline shall be enforced, under which the 
residents-resettlement funds shall be used in an 
overall way, …and the residents to be resettled 
properly relocated to ensure that their working and 
living conditions reach or surpass their previous 
level and that favourable conditions are created for 
the economic and social development in the Three 
Gorges reservoir area.‘204 
‗[t]he people‘s governments and the people in the 
Three Gorges Project inundated areas or in the 
residents-resettlement areas shall take the interests 
of the whole into account, be subordinated to the 
State overall management, and properly handle the 
relationship between residents – resettlement and 
economic development.‘205 
However, interest diversity amongst provinces, which would hamper the 
effectiveness of policies and promises from the center, could not be attained. Therefore, 
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this may be a probable consequence of the unfavorable perception of resettlers by 
provincial leaders. Thus, provincial leaders of both reservoir areas and host provinces 
were more likely to welcome dam construction, since it would bring a huge amount of 
capital to help local economic and social development. Yet, they were necessary in order 
to tackle the thousands of ordinary people who were relocated to their residential 
locations that were inundated. In addition, resettlers found it difficult to establish new 
livelihoods in resettled areas and some found it challenging to get along with the host 
population. Accordingly, it was necessary for provinces to prepare more public 
discussion and allocate a certain proportion of the budget and personnel resources to 
handle the adaptation of the resettlers, as well as being ready for possible confrontation 
with the host population.
206
 For Hubei and Chongqing, the overwhelming majority of the 
population living in the reservoir area was poor, unskilled, and low-educated. Thus, 
cultivation was the exclusive channel for individuals to generate an income and support 
their families. The dam was associated with the loss of considerable hectares of 
farmland or arable land that would be inundated. Subsequently, local authorities 
proposed the transfer of thousands of rural relocatees into secondary and tertiary 
industries, as well as moving into urban areas in order to improve relocatees‘ material 
livelihoods.
207
  
Nevertheless, hundreds of enterprises – including SOEs, township-village 
enterprises (TVEs), and those privately owned – were terminated due to the considerable 
cost incurred in resettlement and their weakness of competing in the market. 
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Notwithstanding the 7000-RMB compensation from the authorities, considerable TVEs 
were terminated and went bankrupt due to the limited improvement of competitiveness 
after the relocation.
208
 Hence, the excessive labor force could not be effectively absorbed. 
For instance, in the Yunyang county of Hubei province, approximately 60 percent of 
peasants-turned-workers were unable to work in a factory, after being promised by the 
local cadres. Therefore, the ideal planning of the center and localities could not be 
actualized.
209
 Subsequently, there seemingly was an apparent shortfall of visions 
between the central and provincial governments – for both reservoir and host provinces; 
and this shortfall would be associated with the discontent and grievance of those affected. 
Ordinary people gathered and fought for their interests through collective actions and 
even violence. In addition to the frequent scandals of corruption and bribe at local level, 
many blamed local cadres for obstructing progress and the vision demonstrated by 
central leaders.
210
 Thus, the hostility between local cadres and ordinary people has 
sharpened, and in 2000 Kaixian county saw a devastating collective incident. Thousands 
of resettlers destroyed buildings, infrastructure and facilities, contested with local cadres 
and were even violent in expressing their discontent against the government‘s 
assignment of their accommodation. In the end, troops had to be deployed to disperse 
resettlers.
211
  
In the perspective of local cadres in the reservoir area, the TGP have an 
uncommon political significance, in that 
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‗… [a]ll local officials know that their careers 
depend on saying what the center wants to hear. 
Hence it is hardly surprising that many local 
officials have kept any reservations about the 
project to themselves, while the less upright among 
them try to advance their careers by participating 
in deceit.‘212 
 
In other words, the smooth completion of the resettlement campaign was believed to 
guarantee the brighter future of promotion and greater political leverage. Thus, despite a 
range of limitations and weaknesses in the resettlement program, officials needed to pay 
enormous political costs to counter the project or to challenge the decision of the central 
leadership. Hence, many were willing to follow central instructions in mobilizing, 
encouraging or even forcing citizens to resettle. Still, as Li mentioned, the unique 
political status of provincial governments in the hierarchy provided a solid guarantee of 
political and administrative leverage for provincial officials.
213
 The central authorities 
were unable to thoroughly implement the resettlement program without local 
government help, and the differentiation of strategies between the center and local 
authorities hampered the effectiveness of policies. Therefore, this subsequently led to a 
variety of humanitarian crises in the reservoir areas and resettlement villages throughout 
the country.
214
  
Localities in NRP – Planning, enforcement and promoter 
 Different from being agents of implementation in the TGP, localities acted as a 
major dynamic force of the NRP a decade later, and hydropower development was 
                                                             
212 Wu Ming, Major Problems Found in Three Gorges Dam Resettlement Program, International Rivers 
Network/ Human Rights in China, [Internet] (accessed on 11 Oct, 2008), available from: 
http://www.hrichina.org/fs/view/downloadables/pdf/downloadable-resources/three_gorges_98.pdf: 4 
213 Linda Chelan Li, ‘Towards a Non-zero-sum Interactive Framework of Spatial Politics: the Case of 
Centre-Province in Contemporary China’, Political Studies XLV, 1997 
214
 Jim Yardley, ‘Chinese Dam Projects Criticized for their Human Costs’, International Herald Tribune (14 
Dec., 2007) 
  90 
considered a critical component of the ‗Open up the West‘ campaign announced in 1999. 
However, before the national planning of hydropower was made by the center, the 
Yunnan government expressed its eagerness to develop hydroelectricity, in conjunction 
with eco-tourism and ethnically cultural promotion, to become the ‗pillars‘ of economic 
development of the province.
215
 In other words, beyond traditionally recognizing pillar 
industries for economic development, the Yunnan provincial government had a mixture 
of motivations to encourage hydroelectricity development.  
Contradictory Actions 
 In chapter 2, the scarce landscape of Sanjiang Biliu, which refers to the parallel 
runoffs of the Nu, the Mekong-Lancang River and the Jinsha-Yangtze River, which are 
in the same region (located in North-western Yunnan), was briefly introduced. This 
region has also been recognized to be a ‗World Heritage‘ site by UNESCO. Also, 
Mertha pointed out that the conjunction of both terrain and recognition was a typical 
illustration of the dilemmatic contest between economic development and environmental 
protection.
216
 He, however, over-simplified the controversy and neglected its 
implications towards Yunnan provincial leaders. In Litzinger‘s article, he claimed that 
Yunnan had introduced the idea of a ‗great ethnic cultural province,‘ which had the 
purpose of promoting the tourist values and uniqueness of Yunnan.
217
 Thus, 
paradoxically, both the approval of natural ‗World Heritage‘ and the plan of NRP seem 
to be alternative strategies of provincial leaders to encourage economic development. 
Fiscal decentralization, as mentioned above, encouraged the shift of responsibilities of 
provincial leaders toward rapid economic growth. Thus, successful economic 
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improvements in the paddock might have brought about better political prospects to the 
provincial leaders. Unfortunately, the ethnic context in Yunnan was no more or less 
complicated than in other parts of China, and they are particularly complex in the 
Western part of the province. Consequently, provincial officials are thought to have a 
strong perception of having a balanced geographical economic development and prevent 
the disparity of benefit among different races. Hence, they proposed to develop the Nu 
River area via the NRP and looked to enrich the material livelihoods of the ethnic 
minorities in the area, without eroding the cultural uniqueness of these minority groups. 
Based on these predispositions, provincial officials might thus be frequently perceived 
as being over-reliant on economic development. Further, the announcements amplified 
the controversy about the NRP. In June 2003, Yunnan television revealed the 
establishment of a new hydropower development corporation financed by the 
consortium and headed by China Huadian Corporation and the Yunnan Development 
Investment Company, with a plan to exploit the hydropower potential in the upper 
reaches of the Nu River. One month later, UNESCO announced its approval of the 
Sanjiang Biliu site to become part of the World Heritage Sites.
218
 Environmentalists or 
dam opponents criticized the Yunnan provincial government for being contradictory on 
the unique environment of Sanjiang Biliu. Unfortunately, the close simultaneity of these 
two events was more likely to be in consequence of unconscious coincidence: they 
happened independently but the simultaneous announcements seemingly ‗linked them 
up.‘ The ‗linkage,‘ therefore, could amplify the argument of anti-dam activisms, such as 
Yu Xiaogang and Wang Yongchen. 
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 In sum, the general role of local leaders has been more aggressive and active in 
the decision making processes of the TGP and the NRP, whereas the motives have 
remained to emphasize economic development in the provinces. In the 1990s, localities 
were still acting as an agent for implementing and mobilizing those affected and became 
relevant for entities following central instructions. In particular, with inter-provincial 
investment and resettlements, localities shouldered the most critical part of practices 
including mobilizing, planning practices, managing, and resolving any legacies. They 
were working on the frontline while the central leadership, through various 
administrative apparatuses, was issuing a range of directions, visions and ideologies in 
Beijing. In spite of the presence of interest fragmentation, localities would never openly 
challenge the central leadership. For instance, they would never criticize the feasibility 
of TGP. This may be due to the strong eagerness toward the project of the center, and 
the expected conjunction of the smooth completion of the project and their political 
prospects. However, they would try to bargain with the center in order to maximize their 
interests or minimize their responsibilities. Uncommonly, localities acted more 
dominantly in the decision making process of NRP. The NRP‘s planning was initiated 
by the Yunnan provincial government as the response of the ‗Open up the West‘ 
Campaign established in the eve of new millennium. It shouldered the planning, 
mobilizing and promoting responsibilities of the project. On the other hand, the 
announcement in quick succession of the planning of the NRP and the recognition of 
World Heritage of the Sanjiang Biliu site, in 2003, amplified the controversy and 
consolidated arguments against the NRP. Thus, the co-existence may hamper the 
legitimacy of the NRP and cause the provincial government to plan recklessly and 
introduce paradoxical strategies of economic development. 
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Bargaining in the Decision-making Process 
To Centre: Restrained Bargaining Partner 
 As mentioned in chapter 1, the uniformity of the Chinese hierarchy was no 
longer considered as absolute compared to that of the Mao period. In the past, the 
coercion of the state was highly emphasized and the Leninist central-periphery 
relationship was completely asymmetrical. Thus, some provincial governments may 
only be mere followers of the centre. Ideology has played an important role in 
mobilizing officials, ordinary citizens and other entities in the country to follow central 
instruction. Currently, provincial governments may express negative opinions on 
policies proposed by the center, so as to articulate their local interests. The central-
provincial relationship seemed to be transformed from being radically center-oriented to 
increasingly provincial-oriented, and the leverages of social mobilization and ideology 
also deteriorated. Therefore, we ask: what factors have become dominant in policy 
making in China, and in particular when developing mega projects? And, how would 
these changes of provinces influence the relationship with the center? These questions 
will be addressed in this section through a comparison of the general findings from the 
actions of provincial governments in the TGP and NRP.   
 The importance of provincial leaders should not be explained only in an 
administrative sense, but further explained in both economic and political senses. 
Provincial leaders – governors and the general secretary of the party in provinces – were 
not the paramount of the vast hierarchal system. However, the great diversity amongst 
provinces provides ample administrative, economic and political advantage for 
provincial leaders, and decentralization further underlines these advantages. Generally 
speaking, they possessed these advantages owing to the intermediary essence of 
provincial leaders between the central authorities and local people. These advantages 
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highlight the center‘s lack of information about local situations, the local governments‘ 
abilities for allocating fiscal revenue to the center, and in declaring the content of ‗local 
interest.‘ Referring to table 4.2, in an administrative sense, due to the significant and 
diverse population in China, the central authorities were incapable of implementing 
policies with absolute coercion. In the ‗Great Leap Forward‘ campaign, as an illustration, 
the ideological embellishment and mass mobilization of the center for ambitious 
development of industrialization and modernization brought inefficient productivity, 
common poverty, and devastating famine throughout the country. The central authorities 
needed provincial governments to provide local information in various aspects in order 
to prevent similar mistakes as those in the ‗Great Leap Forward‘ campaign. Besides, in 
the traditional quasi-federal context, provincial governments should allocate a 
proportion of revenue as a contribution to the center. In China‘s case, economic reforms, 
including the fiscal reform in 1980 (known as fenzhao chifan
219
), allowed provincial 
governments to plan their budgets and issue their budgetary targets. The obligations of 
provinces were to allocate part of the revenue or surplus to the central authorities.
220
 
Consequently, provincial governments may thus have adequate fiscal or budgetary 
resources for economic development, and the central government may not be able to 
restrain the power of provincial leaders through ‗wallet power‘ in an economic sense. 
On the other hand, in a political sense, the role of provincial leaders should not be 
simplified as representatives of the party or the government in provinces; they are also 
‗the creators of provincial interests,‘221 which implies that they could enunciate local 
interests in various political discourse. Yet, this unique leverage may possibly 
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legitimatize their priorities for unfavorable policies in the eyes of ordinary people. Thus, 
the autocratic center was unlikely to completely eliminate the necessity of a presence 
from the local governments. These three leverages could also be illustrated by the TGP 
and NRP, as shown in the table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 – Three Leverages of Provincial Leaders 
Leverages of 
Provincial 
Leaders 
Rationales Impacts for the center Illustration in TGP 
or NRP (case 
specified) 
Administrative The central 
authorities failed 
to access 
considerable 
local information 
without the help 
of provincial 
apparatuses. 
Restrained by 
information contributed 
by provincial 
governments to formulate 
directions and nationwide 
policies. 
Allowance of 
constructing 
practices of 
resettlement 
campaign for local 
governments (TGP). 
Economic The central 
government 
allowed 
provinces to 
construct their 
own budgets and 
share a certain 
proportion of the 
revenue/surplus.  
Loss of ‗wallet power‘ in 
the bargaining or 
negotiation with 
provinces. 
Sichuan‘s opposition 
for a high-dam 
proposal (TGP). 
Political Provincial 
governments 
could articulate 
local interests 
according to 
leaders‘ 
perceptions.  
Ample room for 
provincial governments 
to going off or even 
violate central directions 
or instructions. 
Earlier proposal of 
dam construction in 
the Nu River before 
the official 
establishment of the 
‗Open up the West‘ 
campaign (NRP). 
 
Unfortunately, the rise of provincial governments might probably not represent 
the delegation of central authority. The zero-sum assertion of the central-peripheral 
‗power‘ spectrum does not suffice to explain the interest fragmentation reflecting in the 
decision making process of two projects; however, it seemed to suit the autocratic 
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actions and attitudes of the center in the 1980s.
222
 Li described the essence of the 
central-local retrospective interactions as: 
‗[i]t is impossible for the Centre to win a total 
victory over its intermediary. Provincial 
governments are an indispensable ally of the 
Centre in governance …As neither the Centre nor 
the provinces could decisively win over and 
eliminate the other, both were forced to 
accommodate the interests of the other and to 
compromise.‘223 
 
In other words, while the central government could not have absolute authority over 
replacing or neglecting the presence of provincial governments, such governments could 
also never challenge or even overrule decisions made by the central government. Thus, 
provincial leaders would need to remain obedient to the center, albeit their various 
leverages. For instance, although the Yunnan government was allowed to formulate any 
economic policy for their own economy, the NRP required the approval of the center 
and related ministries at the central level. Thus, the State Council has suspended the 
project for approval in 1999. Additionally, with economic decentralization and 
considerable administrative reform, the core apparatuses of the contemporary Chinese 
bureaucratic system remained Soviet-Leninist style,
224
 which favors a mighty central 
authority, and the perception of local officials seem to be dominated by conventional 
Confucianism; thus implying that officials maintain their ‗sincerity, loyalty and 
reliability‘ to the party.225 Consequently, the expansion of power in the local government 
was associated with decentralization, as economic reform was unlikely to link with the 
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separatism of provinces. This phenomenon was explained as the consequence of self-
restraint and effective political control of the central government. Naughton even 
described central-periphery negotiation as ‗the Centre fights with one hand tied behind 
its back.‘226 In a nutshell, decentralization brought a more symmetrical center-periphery 
relationship for the Chinese bureaucracy. Thus, provincial leaders were provided to 
serve more critically and with greater leverage due to bureaucratic transformation.  
Nonetheless, it was analyzed that provincial leaders were more likely to retain an 
intimate relationship with the party leadership because of the maintenance of s Leninist-
style hierarchy and the influence of conventional Confucianist loyalty in themselves. 
From the case of TGP, they would bargain or negotiate in order to maximize their ‗local 
interests.‘ So, how would provincial bureaucrats interpret and fight for their ‗local 
interests?‘ 
 In retrospect, the legacies of romantic Leninist mobilization, in the ‗Great Leap 
Forward‘ and Cultural Revolution periods, brought material deficiencies through the 
entire country. Accordingly, there was seemingly a great consensus in the state and 
society of seeking for approaches towards improving the material livelihoods of 
society.
227
 Due to the absence of institutions such as the bourgeoisie in the Western 
society representing the interests of ordinary citizens and society in China, provincial 
officials could be viewed as serving as the main representatives of local interests. Under 
this backdrop, provincial officials were generally enthusiastic towards fast economic and 
social development. In other words, economic development of the provinces became the 
most important ‗local interest‘ perceived by provincial leaders. As a result, according to 
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Zheng, a new set of ideological doctrines – ‗local developmentalism‘ – emerged in the 
Chinese hierarchy. 
 Easterly explained ‗developmentalism‘ as a set of ideologies that asserts 
‗(economic and social) development promises a comprehensive final answer to all of 
society‘s problems, from poverty and illiteracy to violence and despotic rulers.‘ 228 
However, his explanation initially aims to explain the phenomenon existing in 
international society and could not be fully applied to the unique backdrop of China in a 
post-Mao period. Given the context of economic (and even political) decentralization in 
China, Zheng generalized six characteristics of ‗local developmentalism,‘ which would 
be demonstrated through examples in TGP and NRP (contained in table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 – Characteristics of Local Developmentalism & Examples in TGP & NRP 
Characteristics
229
 Examples in TGP Examples in NRP 
Cooperate with the center 
so as to escalate economic 
development to become 
the issue with the highest 
priority in both national 
and provincial agenda.  
Promoting the advanced 
development-oriented 
resettlement, in which 
development becomes an 
instrument of resettlement 
and an opportunity to 
encourage resettlement to 
enter another higher 
level.
230
 
Promoting and emphasizing 
the objectives of the project 
in improving the 
accessibility and economic 
development of the most 
remote and ethnically-
complex region in the 
province. 
Taking part in negotiation 
and bargaining with other 
provinces, and even 
bureaucratic organs in the 
center, but also 
maintaining persistent 
economic development of 
the provinces. 
‗Partnership Support 
Programme‘ (PSP) aims to 
encourage the prosperous 
coastal regions to partner 
with any specific counties 
in the reservoir area, so as 
to provide ‗one-to-one 
assistance‘ for resettlement 
and development.
231
 
Interest divergence between 
the coalition‘s pro-dam 
departments in the center 
and the Yunnan provincial 
government against anti-
dam ministries in the center 
and ENGOs. 
High intention of guiding 
provincial economies to 
develop and have fast 
Requiring counties in 
reservoir areas to recognize 
and develop sectors which 
Encouraging the 
development of eco-tourism 
(e.g., the recognition of 
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growth. have greater comparative 
advantage as ‗pillar 
sectors.‘232 
Three Parallel River as 
Natural World Heritage) 
and cultural tourism by 
utilizing the diverse culture 
of the ethnic minority with 
the construction of NRP.
233
 
Direct participation in 
economic activities as the 
role of entrepreneurship 
of provincial 
governments. 
N/A
234
 20% total share of Yunnan 
Huadian Nujiang River 
Hydropower Development 
Co. Ltd belongs to the 
Yunnan Investment Group, 
which is an enterprise 
directly subordinate to the 
Yunnan provincial 
government.
235
 
Uneven development 
policies which are in favor 
of sectors that contribute 
to the largest economic 
growth. 
Peasants were given more 
arable land if they moved to 
grow high yielding plants, 
such as fruits, herbs, and tea 
beyond the initial land 
compensation from the 
authorities.
236
 
Encouraging the 
development of eco-tourism 
(e.g., the recognition of 
Three Parallel River as 
Natural World Heritage) 
and cultural tourism by 
utilizing the diverse culture 
of the ethnic minority with 
the construction of NRP. 
Encouraging various 
sectors and correspondent 
enterprises to expand and 
grow, so as to intensify the 
competitiveness against 
the same sectors in other 
provinces. 
Various temptation policies, 
e.g. tax exemption, lower 
rent or even free use of land 
were employed to attract 
enterprises from the East to 
invest in the reservoir 
area.
237
 
N/A
238
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In short, decentralization provided a fertile land for the growth of ‗local 
developmentalism,‘ in which economic development of provinces dominated and 
influenced the reciprocal interactions between the center and provinces. 
To Civil Society: Scientific Findings & Ideological Mobilization 
 By contrast, the attitude of provincial leaders towards civil society seemed to be 
more indifferent than towards the central authorities. In the Leninist communist society, 
civil society was subordinate to the mighty communist party and vast bureaucracy. 
Despite the presence of a few social organizations beyond the bureaucracy, such as the 
Communist Youth League, these organizations proposed an expansion of the totalitarian 
leverages of the party. Economic liberalization and decentralization, since Deng‘s 
administration, brought forth a flourish of social organizations or associations to 
articulate a variety of interests. Besides, more intellectuals vivaciously engaged in policy 
formulation through a wide range of channels. Yet, even due to the rapid emergence of 
civil society, provincial governments have seemed to remain indifferent and repressive 
towards contributions to civil society. Subsequently, the relationship between civil 
society and provincial authorities has transformed to be more hostile. In this section, I 
will argue that the hostility seems to be inevitable and increasingly violent. Moreover, it 
will imply a further decline in the ideological leverage of authorities. However, the 
provincial-society hostility might lead to a certain degree of civil society independence 
in an administrative sense. 
 As previously mentioned, provincial governments were once viewed as 
representative of society, owing to the absence of class or institutions such as the middle 
class in the Western society in China. However, economic liberalization was 
accompanied by the evolution of property ownership and improvements in material 
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livelihoods. Accordingly, society has been more pluralized even though the party state 
remained mighty, and such changes led to society becoming more fragmented. The 
consensus of economic development, since provincial governments uphold economic 
reform, seemed to be questioned. Thus, a number of civic society organizations were 
established and Chinese civil society saw rapid growth. Additionally, the intellectuals in 
China had been more romantic and willing to shoulder the risk of being marginalized 
and punished, but uncovered the truth. The functions of intellectuals has transformed 
from loyal followers of the Party or revolutionary comrades to become a unique class of 
citizenship in society.
239
 The emergent civil society (in the forms of civic associations 
and individual activists) challenged the existing representation of provincial 
governments to articulate the interests of ordinary people. Subsequently, this may 
probably bring hostility between these two sectors. Retrospectively, the role 
confrontation between civil society and local governments could probably transform to 
be more apparent, especially in rural regions. Without the help of civic voluntary 
organizations, resettlers in rural areas would be more vulnerable to impoverishment; 
resulting in mass rural protests and even riots after relocation. Beyond the incident in 
Kaixian County, mentioned in previous section, another well-known illustration of mass 
protest was in Gaoyang County, Chongqing in 1997; this originated from the discontent 
of insufficient compensation of arable land after relocation and involved direct petition 
against local officials to Beijing.
240
 Economic liberalization was more likely to awaken 
political rightfulness of ordinary citizens. Thus, whether provincial governments could 
retain their representativeness and intermediary essence between the centre and ordinary 
people had been questioned. In particular, with their various leverages listed in table B, 
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provincial leaders and other local leaders were frequently viewed as targets of criticism 
and activism.  
 Nonetheless, the mutual relationship between local governments and civil society 
organizations was not solely confrontational, as they tended to be interdependent in an 
administrative sense. In 1998, the party leadership implemented administrative reforms 
by downsizing the bureaucracy and a huge amount of nearly laid-off bureaucrats were 
absorbed by social organizations, and particularly by those that had a close relationship 
with the authorities. Also, the latest registration system requested social organizations to 
seek a local administrative organ or professional unit as sponsoring unit and to fulfill the 
cumbersome process of registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. These 
administrative processes were aimed towards maintaining the growth of civil society 
under the Party‘s manipulation. In the meanwhile, this enabled social organizations to 
have a greater intention of retaining an intimate relationship with local governments, 
since their actions were regulated and supervised by the sponsoring units. These 
embedded interactions reflect the administrative interdependence of both local 
governments and social organizations. As a consequence, the provincial-society 
relationship should not be over-simplified as mere intimacy or hostility. On the contrary, 
they were more likely to vary their attitudes toward each other so as to cope with 
practical difficulties. However, this stage seems to be short and unsustainable, as the 
provincial-society relationship, generally speaking, was more likely to be 
confrontational.  
 In sum, the authoritarian nature of the central leadership could not eliminate the 
necessity and importance of provincial governments. The intermediary position of the 
provincial governments allowed them to become a ‗contractor‘ of the center to govern 
the paddocks. Besides, owing to the absence of an institutionalized and mature class or 
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organ of articulating local interests, in addition to the egalitarian deficiencies of China, 
provincial governments were regarded as representative of local interests. Therefore, 
provincial leaders would negotiate or barter with the central authorities to maximize 
local interests. In the context of economic liberalization and decentralization, provincial 
leaders tended to represent the willingness of rapid economic development in localities. 
Nevertheless, economic liberalization also contributed to radical, social and economic 
change, and society had more likely to become fragmented and pluralized. Therefore, 
the phenomenon of provincial leaders representing the ‗local interest‘ is in doubt. On the 
other hand, the emergence of civic voluntary organizations may have challenged the role 
of representing the local interests of provincial governments. In the following chapter, 
how these organizations emerged and fought for their interests will be discussed, with 
the aid of the TGP and NRP. 
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Chapter 5 –Civil Society and Hydropower Projects: Passive Players? 
  In previous chapters, the importance of central authorities and local cadres has 
been respectively discussed and examined. Nevertheless, concentrating on investigating 
the facet of authorities is not sufficient to picture the entire scenario of decision making 
about hydropower in China. This is essentially due to the emergent leverages of civil 
social organizations for these mega projects. Therefore, despite the authoritarian nature 
of the communist regime, social organizations (SOs, and also known as ‗civil social 
organizations‘) also played critical roles in the policy making processes. In particular the 
recent suspension of Nu River Project, in which SOs actively expressed their concerns 
of environmental damage such a project might bring, was even regarded as a ‗victory of 
civil society‘241. Therefore, this chapter will examine TGP and NRP from the activists‘ 
perspective and also discuss the transformation of their roles in policy making processes.  
 The overall situations of social organizations would first be introduced in an 
effort to clarify several important concepts mentioned in this chapter, such as ‗social 
organizations‘, and briefly explain the notion of civil society in the Chinese context. 
Several characteristics of social organizations in China, or more accurately 
environmental non-government organizations (ENGOs), will also be demonstrated to 
sketch out orientations and behavioral patterns of SOs. This may facilitate an 
understanding over the palpable transformation of SOs for the TGP and NRP. 
Throughout investigating the actions and contributions of SOs in both projects, this 
chapter will demonstrate that the influence of social organizations in China should not 
be neglected or underestimated; as they have already been one of major contributors in 
the policy making process in China. In the meantime, their leverages, however, should 
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not be exaggerated as having the opportunity to challenge the central leadership. SOs in 
China were unlikely to have any intention to challenge the central authorities. Although 
there might be more confrontations in the state-society relationship, SOs seemed to 
remain awed by the central leadership and reluctant to directly challenge the central 
leadership. In addition, they had behaved in a more strategic and out-going manner 
through cooperating with the mass media and establishing networks with international 
alliances, in order to amplify their leverages and lobby for their interests. In essence, this 
chapter will argue that SOs were able to fulfill their social responsibilities, but were 
unable to bring any political leverage to become more aggressive and radical. In other 
words, they were able to put pressure on the central leadership through a series of 
strategic promotion, activities and alliances, but they may not have been able to satisfy 
political functions to establish an independent and autonomous relationship from the 
party state. Alternatively, this chapter will argue that these entities are still not sufficient 
to determine the success or failure of hydropower development projects in China. 
However, before providing any analysis, a definition of social organizations and other 
important concepts should be clarified.  
 Traditionally, social scientists interpret civil society organizations in accordance 
with two senses. In the sociological sense, the essence of civil society is as an 
intermediate entity between state and ordinary people. Hence, civil society organizations 
should highlight a range of social problems encountered by ordinary people and provide 
material, knowledge or personnel resources in support. On the other hand, the 
independent nature of civil society from the state has been emphasized in the political 
sense. Civil society organizations were viewed as entities that enjoyed autonomy and 
operated without any intervention from the authorities, and that the state-society 
relationship should be on a basis of important political notions, such as citizenship, 
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legitimacy and representation
242
. This implies a responsibility for representing ordinary 
people in order to lobby their various interests, such as rightfulness, justices and even 
power, by reshaping the policies or even denying the existing regime. Nevertheless, civil 
society had generally been subordinate to, or manipulated by, the party state in China. 
After achieving power in 1949, the communist party constructed a vast bureaucratic 
network in the civil society and cracked down on numerous civic organizations in the 
rural area, such as temples, ancestral halls, and clan associations. Thus, civic 
organizations left in this transformation were mainly subordinate to the massive Party 
state. The re-existence of relatively independent social organizations should be traced 
back to the time after the many economic reforms started in 1979. Yu pointed out the 
transformation of ownership forms and the improvement of productivity and living 
standards
243
were major factors contributing to this phenomenon. However, their 
independence was still limited and they were essentially controlled by the Party state. 
Subsequently, one might conclude that there were just a few organizations in China that 
could satisfy the ‗autonomy‘ requirements of the traditional notion of civil society244.  
 Essentially, the public perceive NGOs as being similar to the notion of ‗popular 
organizations‘ (minjian zuzhi)245. In the past, all organizations that are self-governed and 
non-profit, in essence, would be classified as social organizations, non-governmental & 
non-commercial enterprises (also known as Civil/ Private Non-Profit Enterprises; 
hereafter abbreviated as ‗NGNCEs‘ or ‗non-profit enterprises) and foundations. Hence, 
the Chinese official classification of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is 
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different from the Western one. Chinese officials and scholars generally named self-
governed organizations which lobby for diverse interests as non-profit organizations 
(NPOs) rather than NGOs, in order to eliminate the implication of anti-government 
sentiment reflected in the Chinese language
246
. Yang further classified environmental 
organizations which are able to place the official definition of social organizations into 
seven categories in accordance with their registration status (as shown in Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1 – Types of Social Organizations (in environmental realm) in China 
Organizational Type Registration Status Examples 
Registered NGOs Legally registered as 
organizations or private, 
non-profit work units 
Friends of Nature; Green 
River 
Non-profit Enterprises Registered as business 
enterprises but operate as 
non-profit organizations 
Global Village of Beijing; 
Institute of Environment 
and Development;  
Unregistered Voluntary 
Groups 
Unregistered organizations 
that function as NGOs 
Green Earth Volunteers  
Web-based groups  Unregistered groups that 
operate mainly through the 
Internet 
Green-Web; Greener 
Beijing 
Student environmental 
associations 
Registered with campus 
Youth Leagues yet function 
and perceived as NGOs 
Environmental Volunteer 
Association 
University Research 
Centres / Institutes 
Affiliated with institutions 
of higher learning but 
operate as NGOs 
Centre for Legal Assistance 
to Pollution Victims, China 
University of Political 
Science and Law 
Government-organized 
NGOs 
Social organizations 
established by government 
agencies, also known as 
state-owned NGOs  
China Environmental 
Science Association 
Source: Captured from Table 1, Yang Guobin, ‗Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in 
China‘, The China Quarterly, no. 181 (Mar. 2005), 50. 
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In order to avoid misunderstanding, in addition to the inclusion of grass roots 
organizations which have not registered with the authorities but have contributed a lot of 
efforts in social and economic development, this thesis will name all entities that are 
self-governed (or government-controlled civil organizations in different realms) as social 
organizations (SOs). If specific types of organizations were to be highlighted, it will be 
mentioned in detail according to Yang‘s classification. 
  In retrospect, the party-state had never recognized the importance of SOs 
‗development until the Jiang-Zhu administration in 1998. In the 15th Party Congress, 
Zhu Rongji – the former Prime Minister – expressed the necessity to encourage the 
development of ‗social intermediary organizations‘ as a component of deepening 
economic reforms
247
. Initially, the stress of the central leaders tended to reduce the 
responsibilities of tackling the negative impacts of a series of reforms in 1998, such as 
the downsizing of bureaucracy, state enterprise reforms and restructuring the State 
Council
248
. Thus, they emphasized the responsibilities of SOs being intermediary 
between the party-state and ordinary people. In Graph 5.2, the official data of social 
organizations and non-profit enterprises, after the Jiang-Zhu era, is as shown.  
Graph 5.2 – Number of Social Organizations and Civil Non-Profit Units in China 
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Source: Civil Affairs Bureau, Civil Affairs Development Statistical Reports in 2003-2008, [Online Chinese 
File] available from http://cws.mca.gov.cn/article/tjbg/ , Retrieved on 5 Apr., 2010. 
From Graph 5.2, it is clear that the number of registered social organizations has grown 
since 2000. It seems to testimony the direct correlation between leaders‘ encouragement 
and the growth of social organizations. Nevertheless, the graph also indicated another 
noteworthy trend in the development of civil society organizations: that is the rapid 
growth of civil non-profit enterprises. In 1999, the Falun Gong awakened the sense of 
threat for central leaders as it surprisingly gathered approximately 10,000 followers to 
surround the Zhongnanhai, the headquarters of the central leadership, for more than 
thirteen hours. This incident reflected the dilemma that the CCP was facing in the issue 
of the emergence of social organizations. On the one hand, it recognized the necessity 
for SOs in society from their intermediate nature between the state and society
249
, and 
from their absorption of excessive manpower posed by downsizing the bureaucracy
250
; 
on the other hand, it experienced the contest for legitimacy that SOs could bring in 
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Tiananmen Massacre and Falun Gong Crackdown
251
. As a consequence, the party state 
strengthened its manipulation of civil society through a range of administrative and legal 
means, such as seeking for professional units in the bureaucracy
252
, nominating from a 
sponsoring unit for registration, and the inability of appealing against the failure of 
registration. These policies are aimed at restraining the growth of civil society 
organizations under the manipulation of the party in order to move the party away from 
another tremendous confrontation such as with the Falun Gong
253
; hence civil society 
was portrayed as ‗state-led‘ or ‗state-sponsored‘ 254 . This political scenario 
fundamentally influences mutual interactions between the Party and NGOs, as well as 
the development of Chinese NGOs. Hence, it is necessary to demonstrate some 
characteristics of SOs before examining their roles in individual hydropower projects. 
Characteristics of Chinese ENGOs 
 Notwithstanding economic liberalization, the CCP seems to be struggling to 
foster the social openness that allows civil society to have greater autonomy, and is 
reflected by the party‘s administrative restraints and violent repressions. He Baogang 
suggested separating the notions of an opening ‗economic civil society‘ and the closure 
of ‗political civil society‘, in which autonomy of civic society organizations is highly 
related to how high-level officials perceive their political interests; and the essence of 
these organizations relied heavily on their compromises with the party state
255
. Hence, 
the development of civil society is still highly influenced by the authorities. In chapter 2, 
the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 was highlighted to analyze its impacts for the central 
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leadership. This tragedy, additionally, becomes the nightmare of activists and social 
organizations in China. However, the top-down repressions afterward from the party 
seriously hampered the development of civil society. Activists and social organizations 
learned a lesson from this incident and attempted to steer away from political challenge 
with the party. As a result, a paradoxical phenomenon was formed in the state-society 
relationship. He observed this phenomenon through green NGOs; 
‗the Chinese embedded context forces green organizations 
and activities into the role of a partner of the state, rather 
than a representative and defender of certain interests. As 
a result, environmental activists take all necessary means 
to avoid being regarded as, or even having the potential 
for, growing into a full-fledged, green social movement
256‘.   
In other words, due to their fear of the authoritarian CCP, Chinese NGOs tended to 
remain in a fragmented, low-scaled, localized and informally institutionalized stage. 
However, they seemed to encounter drawbacks from remaining in such an immature 
stage of development, such as a lack of financial and personnel resources, public 
unfamiliarity and limited possibility of being involved in policy making. Hence, they 
tended to take part in some ‗specialized and media-attractive, yet politically innocent 
activities
257‘. This intention was arguably to eliminate the functions of NGOs, as it 
hampered organizations‘ capabilities in lobbying for their own interests, or even 
challenging the authorities to fight for their own interests
258
. However, this argument 
seems to be deficient since it was not able to explain the resultant suspension of the Nu 
River Project by ENGOs, and so neglected the pressure constructed through society-
media cooperation. Yang contributed to correlate Ho‘s observation on the fact of 
successful mobilization for the suspension of dam construction in the Nu River Project. 
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He pointed out that Chinese ENGOs were successful in identifying the cleavages of 
bureaucracies and could negotiate with the authorities through kaleidoscopic tactics, 
such as informal coalitions and contact with environmental departments, as well as 
direct petition letter to the leadership. Subsequently, they were able to pressure the 
central leadership despite being closely constrained. This argument would be further 
elaborated after demonstrating the functions and actions of ENGOs in both specific 
projects.  
 Apart from their high awareness and intertwined relationship with the authorities, 
the Chinese NGOs also characterized a heavy reliance on charismatic leaders and 
individuals in the organizations. For example, the Friends of Nature – one of the most 
well-known NGOs in China – depends on the personal network and political prestige of 
Liang Congjie, one of founders of the organization
259
. These leaders generally either 
have experience of being cadres and journalists, who are more likely to have a well-
established informal personal relationship (guanxi) in the bureaucracy and with mass 
media, or ‗(were) strong in professional expertise and international connections260‘. In 
her research, Lu discovered that those leaders who generally had good presentation and 
relations skills, in addition to high fund-raising capabilities
261
, appeared frequently in a 
range of reports, seminars and salons. All of these abilities meant they were able to 
facilitate, and even to determine, the exposure and familiarity of organizations. 
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Therefore, this would fundamentally influence the effectiveness of lobbying and 
participating in policy making. 
 In short, discussing the transformation of civil society is a critical part of 
understanding the policy making processes in China, particularly in the post-reform 
period. Despite the common communist contexts, the Chinese ENGOs were unlikely to 
have the similar influence of their Eastern European counterparts in successfully 
encouraging democratization in their countries. On the contrary, they remained 
influential due to the party‘s tolerance but are reluctant to have antagonistic relationship 
with the authorities. This may, however, be the consequences of autocratic, cruel and 
bloody repressions at Tiananmen Square and of Falun Gong in 1989 and 1999 
respectively. Additionally, a range of administrative instruments existed to obstruct 
social organizations in having legal recognition and development. Thus, Chinese NGOs 
are more likely to be ‗sensitive‘ to the political context of the party state and in 
particular of the central leadership, to prevent it from touching the boundary of the 
central leadership. Undoubtedly, these limitations hinder Chinese NGOs from having 
check-and-balance responsibilities which their western counterparts possess. 
Nevertheless, it does not mean that the Chinese NGOs or activists are unable to pressure 
the authorities and fight for their interests. The facts from TGP and NRP indicate that 
they, on the contrary, could generate huge pressure on the authorities through 
cooperating with the mass media and international allies.  
TGP – Clapping with a Single Hand? 
 In considering the political influences, some features of civil society of China in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s should be introduced, as these features can provide 
contextual influences for engagement of society in policy formulation. Generally, the 
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significance of social organizations and individual activists in TGP seemed to be 
dimmer than provincial leaders. Thus, when the proposal of the Three Gorges Project 
was publicized, it was argued that the major obstacle of this project was negotiation 
within the bureaucracy, rather than pressure from civil society
262
. As mentioned 
previously, civil society in China was seriously hampered in the June-Fourth Massacre. 
In this massacre, students, intellectuals, and workers demonstrated the potential leverage 
of civil society against the authorities and, hence, the party state revised its attitude for 
the development of the civil society. Institutionalization of social organizations had 
become one of the major concerns of the party. Within the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(MOCA), a division office took care of the institutionalization, development and 
management of social organizations. Apart from more institutionalized and stricter 
supervision for the civil society, the party state also strengthened the regulatory system 
so that more social organizations were abolished
263
. Subsequently, the contributions of 
social organizations and individual activists were limited. In addition, the central 
leadership had launched a campaign of ‗directing the public opinion‘ in which anti-dam 
opinions were prohibited in the mass media, resulting in it being more difficult for 
individual activists to amplify their heterogeneous opinions. The limitations of 
environmental activists and agencies did not only exist in their attempts to reach the 
media and the public, but also in their efforts to establish coalitions with international 
society.  
 According to Khagram, a number of foreign and international environmental 
organizations, such as Probe International, River Watch East and Southeast Asia and 
International River Network, expressed strong opposition to the implementation of TGP 
and persuaded other governments from engaging in this project. Foreign opponents 
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suggested a range of arguments against diverse aspects of the project such as 
environmental damage, cultural heritage, and navigational obstructions; it then published 
anti-dam writings of Chinese journalists and scholars, such as Dai‘s Yangtze! Yangtze! 
and Wu Ming‘s field report264, so as to mobilize domestic intellectuals and celebrities to 
alter the Chinese government‘s determination. The close existence of anti-dam 
movements abroad and hunger strike of students in Beijing caused Chinese leaders to 
think about linking these two independent activities and tackled these problems ‗with the 
full range of repressive tactics available under their authoritarian regime‘ 265 . The 
oppressive and autocratic attitude of the central leadership obstructed Chinese 
environmental intellectuals and organizations from taking part in the feasibility 
assessment of the project. Consequently, despite their forecasts of the destructive 
environmental damage, Chinese activists and organizations did not express their full 
opposition against the project.  
 Not only were opinions of anti-dam activists and organizations suppressed in the 
policy making process due to the ‗guiding public opinion‘ campaign before the approval 
of the NPC for the project, opinions of some NGOs and intellectuals who have close 
links with the party state were also filtered by the authorities. However, they were 
allowed to express opinions for the project, such as conducting researches to provide 
recommendations for various aspects of the project
266
. However, they were not be able 
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to challenge the feasibility of the project and could only provide supportive testimonies 
and evidences which were favorable for the project
267
.  
 In the early 1990s, social organizations were not given sufficient legal and 
political sphere to develop, so only a few institutionalized organizations existed to 
participate in the decision making process; and research centres in universities were 
considered the exception. Under the blessings of universities, these research centres 
benefited from a certain degree of resources and personal supports for conducting 
researches on the Three Gorges Project. Policy recommendations in researches from 
some renowned universities, such as Tsing Hua University and the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS), were even considered when policies were discussed
268
. 
Nevertheless, their researches could not challenge the feasibility of the project. 
Consequently, the participation of intellectuals and experts from different disciplines, to 
some extent, were constrained.  
 In short, voluntary organizations and individual activists outside the bureaucracy 
would rarely participate and lobby for any feasibility assessment of the project. This was 
essentially due to the strong repressions of the party leadership since the Tiananmen 
Massacre and the ‗guiding public opinion‘ campaign before the approval of the project 
by NPC. Domestic anti-dam intellectuals and activists had limited links with the media 
needed to amplify their arguments to the public. Just a few -- such as Dai Qing, Wu 
Ming and Jun Jing -- could approach foreign publishers and other anti-project activists 
abroad to lobby their interests or to express their viewpoints about the project. Other 
intellectuals and scholars, both for and against the project, could conduct their 
researches and make recommendations in limited ways. Yet, they were unlikely to 
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challenge official feasibility assessment and determination of the project. Currently, 
even as the dam is approaching completion, researchers are not allowed to enter 
reservoir areas in Chongqing Municipality to conduct any research. Strict repressions by 
the authorities made the project ‗taboo‘ in China and impeded individual activists‘ 
efforts to contribute to the project beyond what has been done by the authorities. The 
TGP reflects the political and social reality in policy formulation of mega projects and 
infrastructure construction which are determined by the party state autocratically and 
where civil society was not sufficiently engaged. Yet there has been a huge change with 
the NRP, in which social organizations, or more accurately, environmental social 
organizations seemed to have some ability to suspend implementation of gigantic 
hydropower projects and even involve in the decision making of the project.  
NRP—Evidence of the Rise of SO? 
 After more than a decade of the TGP, another mega hydropower project reflected 
how emergent civic society hopes to pressure the authoritarian government. 
Environmental voluntary agents, such as Green Watershed (GW) and Friends of Nature 
(FN), seemed to contribute significantly to altering the initial determination of the 
central authorities in encouraging hydroelectricity development. In particular, in the Nu 
River Project, 13 dams were proposed to be constructed along the Nu River in Yunnan 
Province and Chinese ENGOs were praised as they succeeded in effectively obstructing 
the project. In the 1980s, the contribution of ENGOs and other civil social organizations 
were strongly suppressed by the mighty party state, particularly after the Tiananmen 
Square Massacre. Nevertheless, they could amplify their opposition against the project 
through cooperating with other players, such as the media, international organizations 
and environmental agencies within the bureaucratic systems. The extreme differences in 
the consequences of the NRP and the TGP might thus indicate the transformation of 
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roles of civil society in policy formulations and hydroelectricity development in China. 
This section, therefore, will sketch out the process of ENGOs for contesting the NRP 
and examining their roles in the project.  
 The participation of emergent ENGOs in the conservation of Nu River should be 
referred back to controversies involved in the construction of Manwan Dam over the 
Lancang River, in the mid-1990s. Although it is not a direct component of the gigantic 
Nu River Project, it should be recognized as a starting point of the state-society contest 
about hydroelectric development projects in South-West China. In the midst of these 
controversies, the Yunnan provincial government came into direct confrontation with 
one of the most influential grass-root ENGOs in Yunnan – GW. The Yunnan provincial 
government once investigated GW on suspicion of it engaging in illegal issues, 
dispatching a representative team from the local bureaucrats and scholars from Yunnan 
Academy of Social Sciences (YASS) with requests for the organization to disband. 
When the representative team visited the Nujiang region for investigation, they 
encountered petition from ordinary people testifying to the innocence of the GW
269
.  
Besides, the tense relationship of GW with the Yunnan provincial government since the 
Manwan Dam controversy has uncovered cleavages within the vast bureaucratic system. 
This is significant, for when the Yunnan provincial government ordered GW to disband, 
SEPA – one of environmental administrative organs in the centre – showed its favorable 
stance to the GW and claimed that the GW was innocent, while also criticizing the 
Yunnan provincial government as not having sufficient testimonies for their order 
against GW
270
.  
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In retrospect, the successful recognition of the proposed NRP site as a ‗natural‘ 
World Heritage Site, and the effectiveness of the new Environmental Impact Assessment 
Law (hereafter abbreviated as ‗Environmental Law‘) in 2003271 were symbolic turning 
points of the state-society confrontation in the NRP. Before 2003, ENGOs, particularly 
grassroots organizations that did not have close relationship with the authorities, had 
limited channels to lobby their interests and arguments, and these interests included 
educating the affected people and having interviewing shown on a national television 
station. These two incidents in 2003 could effectively consolidate their arguments 
against the project and draw the attention of the public to this area. It might also 
facilitate ENGOs to mobilize their international allies and media, and amplify their 
opposition to the project. For example, twenty journalists, scholars and environmental 
protection volunteers from Beijing were invited and organized for a nine-day trip to the 
Nu River by GW and Global Volunteers (GV) in February 2004. In the midst of the trip, 
participants collected stories from residents and recorded videos to reflect the status quo. 
It was regarded as an important step for local grassroots ENGOs to make the anti-dam 
campaign one that was worthy of nationwide attention
272
.  
 Different from their successors after the Tiananmen Massacre, Chinese ENGOs 
had been more aggressive in expressing their discontent towards the project. Apart from 
mobilizing the mass media and their counterparts in other regions, they had even 
petitioned the central leadership directly by collecting signatures of scholars, journalists, 
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students and celebrities in the society and then sending the petition letter and collected 
signatures to leaders in Zhongnanhai. This was particularly useful for ENGOs under the 
control of the leadership who either had a close relationship with bureaucrats or 
participated in the NPC or Chinese People‘s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). 
This method could be properly illustrated by the petitioning action of Green Earth 
Volunteers (GEV) – one of important but unregistered ENGOs in China – in December 
2003. Wang Yongchen was the famous leader of GEV and had a close relationship with 
State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) – one of important environmental 
protection apparatus of the Chinese government. She encouraged approximately sixty 
renowned and influential scholars, journalists and celebrities to sign the petition letter in 
order to request an intervention by the central government, so that the Nu River was 
protected from gigantic dam construction
273
. Besides, more than 10,000 students in 
Chongqing Municipality signed a petition letter to express their common opposition 
against Nu River Project in 2005.  
 In a nutshell, Chinese ENGOs differed from their western counterparts because 
of their restrained autonomy and lack of independence from the authorities. Nevertheless, 
the success of obstructing the NRP from implementation has attracted worldwide 
attention to the development of Chinese ENGOs. It is believed that the influence of 
Chinese ENGOs in policy formulation could no longer be underestimated or neglected. 
In the anti-dam campaign, these ENGOs had utilized a wide range of channels – 
domestic, national and even international -- to amplify their arguments in order to 
construct a sufficient pressure area and demand that central authorities intervene in the 
policy making process of the NRP. Different organizations utilized channels and tactics 
that were more likely to be successful in drawing the public‘s attention or gaining a 
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respectable advantage, such as developing close relationships with the authorities, media 
or affected people. In addition, they had closer alliances and more frequent interactions 
or co-operative efforts with their international counterparts, such as the World Wildlife 
Fund, and the International River Network. However, do these actions mean that the 
tremendous transformation of SOs could enable them to have a more dominant role in 
developing mega projects? In the following section, the transformation of civil society in 
China will be discussed and society‘s roles in both projects will be compared. Hence, it 
is argued that social organizations have been more significant in the decision making 
process, but they are still encountering a variety of limitations and need to deal with 
these limitations with the aid of other fields in society. 
Civil Society in Decision Making Process 
Dilemma of Social Organizations: Autonomy vs. Influential power 
 Despite the recent emergence of SOs, civil society remained in a subordinate 
relationship with the Party after the establishment of PRC; therefore, Chinese civil 
society was suspected of not being eligible to fit into the conventional definition of a 
‗civil society. With the TGP, the skepticism against Chinese civic society organizations 
seemed to be valid, since the formation and opinions of civic voluntary organizations 
were mainly repressed or ‗guided‘ by the authorities. Although there were a few 
individual activists breaking through the closed oppression of the authorities and 
connecting with international civic organizations, the majority of civic voluntary 
organizations were still being scared by the nightmare of Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. 
Owing to previous lessons of cruel and bloody oppressions of the authorities since 1949, 
Chinese civic organizations were struggling in the predicament of autonomy and 
survival in a narrow political sphere. Thus, in order to gain a larger public sphere, SOs 
sought an amiable relationship with the authorities – both central and local – and 
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managed to become generally supplementary to the policy implementation of state
274
. In 
the eyes of the SOs‘ leaders, having an amiable and meshed relationship with the 
government and the Party, yet compromising on a certain degree of autonomy and 
independence, was the most effective way of gaining influence
275
. White suggested that 
the authorities recognized the necessity of social organizations in dealing with new 
challenges of economic and social changes that are associated with economic 
liberalization, but believed that the political and social threats, posed by uncontrolled, 
un-disciplined and disarrayed SOs should be managed and disciplined. Thus, the party 
state would maintain close supervision in the development of civil social organizations. 
Saich further explained this logic in the party-state perspective: 
‗…the state has tried to influence key groups in society by 
binding them into organizations that become dependent on 
its patronage. To head off potential mass opposition, the 
state will attempt to extend its organization, co-ordination 
and supervision of as much of the population as 
possible……This move by the state from insulation from 
society to integration within it can be interpreted as an 
attempt to prevent a plurality of definitions arising by 
revising the structure of the regime and the state‘s 
relationship with the society
276‘.  
From Saich‘s analysis, the Party state had transformed its participatory pattern from 
‗insulation‘ to ‗integration‘ and it seemed that Chinese SOs might have greater 
autonomy than before. This may probably be the consequence of the diversification of 
funding sources. In the past, the largest share of SOs funding was from the Party state 
and this was particularly true for GONGOs. In Table 5.3, the funding structure of SOs is 
shown.  
Table 5.3—Funding Structure of Social Organizations in China277 
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Type of funding Percentage 
Government Subsidies and Grants 50 
Membership Fees 21.2 
Income through Commercial Activities 6 
Project Funding or Grants by Companies 5.6 
Others 4 
Project Funding by the Government 3.6 
Collection Funding 2.2 
Donations by Individuals (Excluding Membership 
fee) 
2 
Surplus Funding from the Previous Year 1.8 
Project Funding or Grants by International 
Organizations 
1.6 
Capital Turnover 1.2 
Project Funding or Grants by Domestic Foundations 0.5 
Loans (Commercial & Non-Commercial) 0.3 
Source: Table 2.3, Ho, 2008:32 
By compromising on autonomy, these GONGOs were supported with stable and 
considerable fundings from the state. On the contrary, for those organizations which 
have a weaker linkage with the authorities, a significant proportion of fundings was 
made available from abroad
278
. For example, the Centre of Biodiversity and Indigenous 
Knowledge (CBIK), which is based in Kunming, Yunnan, intensified its foreign funding 
income from U.S. $203,000 in 2002 to nearly U.S.$ 550,000 in 2004
279
. Nevertheless, 
the situation more or less changed in the anti-dam campaign. More Chinese ENGOs 
could access funding from their foreign counterparts, such as International River 
Netwok, and Oxfam in Hong Kong
280
. Besides, more organizations have become self-
sufficient. It might probably be the consequence of a contraction in government funding 
towards domestic social organizations associated with downsizing reform of the 
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government. Ma pointed out that it widened the interest gap between SOs and the Party, 
and would further motivate SOs to approach foreign sources or sources beyond the 
public sector. Accordingly, the motivation and orientation of SOs to be autonomous 
from government‘s intervention would be accelerated281.    
In short, Chinese SOs tended to have an intimate relationship with the 
government, even though it might sacrifice a certain degree of autonomy and 
independence. The apparent advantage of this action meant that not only did 
organizations have more resources and fundings to develop, it also enabled them to have 
greater leverages for lobbying their interests. Unfortunately, the gradual retreat of 
government from intervening in the civil society and curtailing the government‘s 
funding towards organizations have widened the interest gap between the government 
and SOs. Subsequently, the state-society relationship might incur more confrontation 
than before, with the anti-dam campaign in the NRP being a typical illustration for this 
phenomenon.  
International Alliance and Media Activisms 
  On the other hand, while ENGOs were successful in urging the government to 
suspend the Nu River Project from construction, the influence of the media and 
international non-governmental organizations should not be neglected. In this section, I 
will argue that the media and international organizations seem to have become an 
effective catalyst in reinforcing the pressure from Chinese SOs against the government, 
in particular the media. In retrospect, Chinese SOs had limited contacts with their 
international counterparts. This may have been due to the authoritarian insulation by the 
Party into the civil society. Additionally, from the TGP, the autocratic repression of 
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opposition in the civil society by the CCP hampered transnational coalitions of SOs. 
Khagram further analyzed that 
‗China‘s authoritarian regime prevented domestic anti-
dam proponents from effectively accessing domestic 
decision-making structures as well as from forging 
sustained coalitions with trans-nationally allied 
nongovernmental advocacy organizations. Perhaps most 
important, however, the lack of domestic social 
mobilization limited the ability of opponents to more 
dramatically alter the trajectory of the Three Gorges 
Dam282.‘ 
Accordingly, a number of scholars and activists tried to access the foreign anti-dam 
network and provide information of the Three Gorges Dam.  
 Since the mid-1990s, the intermediary position of civil society between the party 
state and ordinary people has provided opportunities for SOs to develop their links and 
cooperation with other Party organs, in particular the mass media. Due to the 
paradoxical confrontation between the politically ascendant Party and market power 
since 1980s, the mass media tended to expand their professional values and autonomy. 
As a consequence, these organizations seemed to ‗share structurally similar positions 
with the mass media
283‘. This reciprocal relationship between society and the media has 
tightened their coalition but it tended to be informal. The NRP was thereby viewed as 
the most effective example of reflecting the society-media coalition. In their article, 
Yang and Calhoun explained that mass media could facilitate the excavation of a broad 
public sphere, which refers to ‗the space for public discourse and communications‘ so as 
to provide fertile land for the growth of public opinion about the environment
284
. They 
observed that ENGOs in the anti-NRP campaign acted in a pivotal role and the media 
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could reinforce the controversy of the issue in an effort to stir up more diverse public 
opinion
285
. For instance, Wang Yongchen allied with Zhang Kejia, who is a senior and 
well-known journalist in China, to have numerous news reports published about the anti-
NRP debate in China Youth Daily
286
. Additionally, there was a related exhibition in 
Beijing in which a number of celebrities, journalists and scholars were invited to 
participate
287
. All these actions of cooperation both social organizations and the media 
have seemingly mounted a greater debate about the project beyond local society.  
 On the other hand, the coalitions between Chinese social organizations with 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) were also another important 
catalyst for putting pressure on the centre. Apart from amplifying the opposition voices, 
the close coalitions of domestic and international NGOs might have positive 
contribution for encouraging institutional reforms, or even democratization, of the 
country
288
. Since 1995, interactions between domestic and international NGOs and 
agencies have been closer. For instance, the World Bank and INGOs directly subsidized 
domestic NGOs to further develop – both technically and financially. Some Chinese 
NGOs introduced the ways of operation from their international or foreign counterparts 
in an effort to improve their administrative efficiency
289
. Through contrasting the 
situations of TGP and NRP, the effectiveness of international-domestic organizations‘ 
coalitions to pressure the centre seems to be further verified. In the TGP, the domestic-
international nexus was limited. Not only social organizations, but the connections of 
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individual activists were also retrained. Only a few of scholars could establish networks 
with foreign counterparts. Dai Qing, the most well-known opponent against the Three 
Gorges Project, communicated with a variety of international organizations, such as 
Probe international, to mount the opposition campaign of the large dam construction. 
Yet, due to their limited relationship with domestic social organizations, the INGOs 
showed their opposition to, and petition against, the Three Gorges Project. They even 
lobbied the different state institutions to draw them away from financing the project, and 
criticized to the feasibility report conducted by the Chinese government. Apparently, the 
influence of this criticism seemed to be limited. The Chinese government simply chose 
to finance the project without foreign financial aid in order to go around INGOs‘ 
obstruction. By contrast, the actions of INGOs in the anti-NRP campaign were more 
effective by cooperating with domestic NGOs. Since the late 1990s, more INGOs have 
established their offices in China, such as Greenpeace, Oxfam and Friends of Earth 
(Hong Kong), and their correlations with domestic NGOs had been closer
290
.  Thus, 
Yang pointed out the ‗symbiotic‘ relationship between domestic and international NGOs. 
While INGOS could establish domestic partnerships to implement their global agendas, 
local NGOs could access more funding, information and resources beyond the Party 
state in order to possess more independence
291
. With the NRP, the coalition of INGOs 
and domestic NGOs has tightened. Prior to the announcement of suspending the NRP, 
sixty international NGOs gathered and signed a petition letter against the NRP, which 
was sent directly to the Chinese government, and they also called on UNESCO to 
intervene
292
.  
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 Undoubtedly, the ENGOs and SOs in other related aspects were pivotal to the 
Chinese anti-dam campaign. However, from contrasting the cases in TGP and the NRP, 
it is not difficult to see that the obstruction of domestic civil society is not as strong as 
anticipation. The inclusion of mass media and international NGOs probably reinforced 
the bargaining power of social organizations. In the TGP, the Party leadership launched 
a campaign of ‗guiding public opinion‘ across the whole country in an authoritarian 
manner. Thus, the stances of the media were generally favorable towards the project. In 
addition, local organizations and activists were constrained by their ties to international 
networks. The sole opposition by international NGOs did not sufficiently alter the 
central decision of constructing the gigantic dam. On the contrary, the coalition of 
domestic ENGOs-mass media-INGOs stressed the contradictory actions of the Yunnan 
provincial government and state-owned power enterprise to develop the series of 13 Nu 
River dam construction projects. Moreover, they have amplified the anti-dam campaign 
so as to draw nationwide attention, and have thus more likely provoked the central 
leadership to intervene and alter the decision.  
 Even with the success in halting the NRP, the development of civil society in 
China does not look optimistic and no one should assume Chinese social organizations 
have the ability to challenge the Party state. In the past, Chinese NGOs have tended to 
value an intimate relationship with the authorities, even though they might have to 
compromise a certain degree of independence and autonomy. For leaders of these NGOs, 
they preferred to insert themselves into the policy-making processes, rather than to 
directly confront the Party. The vague attitude of social organizations might largely be 
due to the autocratic and violent history of top-down state repression. Additionally, the 
essence of Chinese NGOs is generally informal, un-institutionalized and immature. 
Consequently, they would have encountered more constraints and limitations in the 
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development and sustainability of organizations, if they had been more independent 
from the government. Nonetheless, the administrative reforms of the government in 
1998 contributed to civil society and these have led to further development, since more 
excessive manpower has been absorbed by social organizations and the government has 
gradually curtailed its subsidies towards social organizations. In the new millennium, the 
society-government confrontation seemed to be fiercer. For instance, in the NRP, the 
ENGOs allied with INGOs and the mass media to lobby using arguments against the 
dam construction effort. 
Through these strategic actions with other entities in society, Chinese social 
organizations have wanted to encourage leadership and the public to broaden their 
considerations beyond economic development
293
. Distinct from their Eastern European 
counterparts, Chinese NGOs are more unlikely to challenge the legitimacy of the Party. 
However, they would intensify the fragmentation of interests in the society and 
diversification the agenda within the Party leadership. Thus, one might conclude that 
they could satisfy their sociological functions to import more issues and departmental 
interests for debate with the government
294
, but they are more likely to be weak and 
reluctant in fostering the democratization of the country and directly challenging the 
Party. However, even the sociological intentions might actually influence the policy 
formulation process of China and modify the FA model in the theoretical sense.    
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
  After much progress, a series of questions have been addressed through a review 
of reciprocal interactions and transformation of leverages in three important players, i.e. 
central government, provincial governments and officials, and the civil society in the 
decision making processes of the Three Gorges and the Nu River projects. (1) However, 
why should these three players be recognized as critical in decision making process? 
Thus, beyond these three, are there any players which are secondary but critical in the 
different processes? (2) How did these players perceive and exercise their own roles and 
interests in the processes? (3) How did the political and economic contexts of these two 
projects determine and transform individuals‘ perceptions? As the final part of the thesis, 
this chapter intends to summarize the findings of previous chapters and further explain 
the findings to the applicability of the FA model. Also, explanation will be given to how 
the findings contribute to further studying the prospects of China and global 
hydroelectricity development, as well as institutional development.   
 The thesis begins with an overview of hydroelectricity development in China, 
which originated from the necessity of river management for human and scientific 
revolutions in the modern world; and China has possessed a longest history of river 
management. Successful river management is represented in the legitimacy and 
sustainability of the regime and the changes that Chinese river management has gone 
through. Thus, I argue that dam construction is essentially full of political significance, 
and that, in the contemporary China, dam construction functions as more than mere 
counter-flooding. Famous leaders, such as Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong and Deng 
Xiaoping, hoped to reinforce the modernization of the Chinese economy through dam 
construction. In addition to the practical shortfall of energy consumption since economic 
reforms, hydroelectricity has become one of the most important and grand strategies for 
economic and social development in the eyes of the elite. The TGP and NRP reflected 
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two stages of hydroelectricity development in China and in contemporary China 
respectively. Thus, in the following section, the transformation of bargaining amongst 
actors will be summarized.   
Dimensional Bargaining of Players 
 Summarizing the transformation of complicated bargaining amongst actors 
should be classified as reciprocal interactions, bargaining knots and strategies. In chapter 
1, the bargaining ‗knots‘ were stated to represent the consideration and contentions of 
actors in the decision making processes of the individual projects.  
Reciprocal Interactions 
 Referring to Graph 6.1 (sees p.140), the interactions of actors are more 
independent from others; in other words, there were few collective actions and little 
cooperation between actors. However, this may have been due to the autocracy of the 
central leadership during that period. Thus, later in the June-Fourth Massacre in 1989, 
the decision making process of the TGP was more leadership-oriented. In this project, 
the party leadership, led by Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng, became the dynamic force for 
the successful implementation of the project. Under this backdrop, the debate of this 
project was fierce but limited. Researchers and central and local officials were reluctant 
and lacked the sphere to challenge decisions over the feasibility of projects presented by 
the leadership. As a result, other actors seemed to become feeble compared to the 
mighty party leadership, and in particular, mass media and civil society. Prior to the 
official approval of the project in the NPC, the central government launched a ‗guiding 
public opinion‘ campaign to suppress anti-project opinions and requested that mass 
media comment positively on the project. Accordingly, there was only a small sphere for 
domestic social organizations and individual activists who developed and amplified their 
oppositional opinions towards the project. Hence, the project was rarely challenged even 
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though it had aroused worldwide attention and extensive criticism. On the other hand, 
local cadres, particularly cadres from reservoir areas, predicted that the project would be 
associated with an enormous amount of capital injection into the local economies from 
the centre. This considerable capital and other related policies were viewed as 
instruments for fostering the economic development of these provinces. Thus, they were 
generally favorable towards decisions from the centre, even though there were scattered 
debates on the details of particular issues, such as the height of a dam and the 
management of resettlements, and so on.  
 In contrast, triangular interactions in the NRP (see Graph 6.2, p.141) were 
relatively responsive and confrontational. Decentralization evolved, since economic 
reforms had eliminated the participation of central governments in the practical 
formulation of local economic issues, and provincial governments were granted the right 
to intensify autonomy of policy formulation. Therefore, the central-periphery 
relationship and responsibilities had transformed, even though the subordinating 
relationship generally remained unchanged. Apart from the provincial governments, the 
emergence of civil society and the rationalization of the mass media, since the late 1990s, 
enabled social organizations to have a greater political sphere of development. 
Subsequently, their participation in the NRP became more aggressive and hostile. They 
were able to criticize the NRP directly and amplify their contentions through various 
channels, particularly via cooperation with their international counterparts and the 
domestic media, such as CCTV, the internet and the press. Through these channels, they 
were able to arouse national awareness and even direct petition to the central leadership, 
which could effectively reinforce anti-project pressure towards central government. This 
is why Wen Jiabao, the Prime Minister of the State Council, would publicly announce 
the suspension of the NRP. Apparently, although still powerful, the central leadership 
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has been more responsive to the issue. In chapters 3 and 5, the project was mentioned as 
being approved by the National Development and Reform Commission in the State 
Council, at its initial stage. Nevertheless, civil society, in collaboration with mass media 
and international NGOs, were able to reinforce public opinion against the project, which 
enabled the central government to reshape and intervene, and thus suspend the process.  
Bargaining Knots 
 Bargaining knots in the interactive triangles of two projects represented the 
differentiation of focus points and rationales behind their interactions towards others. 
Thus, due to the strong legacies of the Tiananmen Square Massacre during the decision 
making process, the bargaining knots of actors in the TGP reflected that the project was 
viewed as a means to bailout of legitimacy crisis in the party. For the central leadership, 
however, the cruel suppression of the student movement in the massacre damaged the 
legitimacy of the party, and it was necessary for the party leadership to have an 
instrument for consolidating the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime. Moreover, the 
shared background of technocracy and the considerable personal interests of leaders in 
the project favored an autocratic attitude of the leadership towards it. Beyond the central 
leadership, individuals in civil society were also influenced by the legacies of the 
Tiananmen Square Massacre. They tended to be in awe of the leadership which 
prevented them from confronting against the party directly. Besides this, the massacre 
bated their contacts with a number of international counterparts, owing to close 
supervision and manipulation from the authorities after the massacre. Subsequently, 
their stance was generally favorable towards the project and the debate concentrated on 
the details of it.  
Meanwhile, provincial leaders, because of the absence of a middle class in the 
society and their intermediary nature between ordinary people and central government, 
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had the responsibility of representing local interests which requested the maintaining or 
pursuance of high pace economic growth. A series of administrative reforms at the 
provincial level, such as fiscal decentralization, rationalization of agencies and 
empowerment of local governments, brought about the pursuit of high economic growth 
rates as means to influence the probability of promotion
295
. Accordingly, provincial 
leaders were motivated to adopt a strong pro-growth stance and economic development 
of the provinces, and there exists a phenomenon known as ‗local developmentalism‘. 
Provincial leaders would be aggressive in order to retain a high growth rate of revenue 
and develop various industries in higher preference, similar to an entrepreneur
296
. 
Alternatively, they would also compete for resources, capital and manpower in order to 
facilitate both industrial and economic development. Owing to the considerable capital 
and manpower associated with gigantic projects, they would view these projects, such as 
TGP and NRP, as an opportunity to accelerate the economic growth of individual 
provinces; and this would thereby produce better career and political prospects. As a 
result, provincial leaders generally prefer dam construction. Thus, the bargaining tool of 
provincial leaders seemed not only to retain but also to reinforce their pro-growth 
perceptions.  
 Moreover, although there was rapid economic liberalization, the ‗open door‘ 
policy widened the income disparity between rural and urban areas, as well as coastal 
and interior regions. When Yunnan province proposed to construct the Nu River Project, 
provincial leaders wanted to improve the accessibility of the most remote region of 
South Western China and to accelerate revenue through selling hydroelectricity. Thus, 
the utilitarian rationales of the provincial cadres for supporting the NRP were the 
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illustrations of their developmentalist doctrine. There is no doubt that the dynamic of 
promoting NRP was no longer with the central government, but the Yunnan provincial 
government. The indifference of the central government was a consequence of further 
decentralization in the 1980s. Currently, the central government will no longer directly 
participate in policy formulation of economic development, but can provide grand 
instructions to agencies in the lower level of the hierarchy and would keep its power of 
approval for policies. Consequently, the role of coordination for central government 
seems to be fostered, while its authority has been restrained due to decentralization. 
Unfortunately, the cleavages amongst bureaucratic agencies at the central level might be 
wide and apparent. However, penetration of market mechanisms into the bureaucratic 
system has moved the hierarchy to be more modernized and segmented. Thus, the 
bureaucratic apparatus has become the route to pursue departmental goals and interests, 
and this phenomenon deepened cleavages amongst organs. While the central leadership 
becomes the referee and coordinator who impartially consider interests of the various 
organs, they require more time to achieve a consensus and prevent decision from being 
made too quickly. The self-restraint of the central leadership
297
 also contributed to the 
greater political sphere for social organizations and the mass media. Furthermore, 
organizations and mass media will also encounter keen competition owing to economic 
liberalization and marketization. In the late 1990s, a series of administrative reforms 
enabled mass media and social organizations to have greater autonomy and degree of 
international linkages. They transformed to become more willing to criticize specific 
aspects of policies which could then avoid direct challenges to the central leadership, 
such as environmental protection. Under this backdrop, ENGOs and mass media were 
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willing and able to form coalitions against the construction of the NRP, in addition to 
extending the coalitions to include international NGOs.  
Applicability of FA Model  
 Despite leaders‘ domination in both feudal and contemporary Chinese systems, 
the vast bureaucratic system has been shown to be complicated and fragmented. In the 
system, an organ, and particularly departments at the local level, will be subordinated to 
more than one unit. For example, the Civil Affairs Department at the county level is 
subordinated to both the county government and the Civil Affairs bureau of the central 
and provincial governments. Even the governors from the provincial governments need 
to be somewhat administratively accountable to the National People‘s Congress, the 
Communist Party Committee in the provinces, and the Central government. This 
complicated accountability / relational matrix has made the authority, priority and 
directions of policy formulation become more segmented.
298
 As a consequence, the 
model of Fragmented Authoritarianism suggested by Kenneth Lieberthal, has modified 
these relations as kuai and tiao which symbolize the professional relationship of 
territorial coordination and leadership relationship of functional bureaucratic branches 
amongst the apparatus respectively
299
. In reality, Lieberthal argued that the priority of 
reforms should be given to the horizontal professional relationship rather than the 
vertical leadership relationship; a phenomenon known as ‗making tiao to serve kuai‘.300 
In the cases of TGP and NRP, the kuai relationship influenced the implementation of the 
project. In the chapter 3, the contradiction between the Ministry of Water Conservancy 
and the Ministry of Electric Industry in the 1980s was highlighted to illustrate how the 
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FA model could be applied in the TGP case. The separation of these two central 
ministries uncovered the ‗in-house‘ negotiations in an organ. The Ministry of Water 
Conservancy would like to implement the project as soon as possible while the Ministry 
of Electric Industry put the project in a lower priority and postponed the schedule of 
investigation and negotiations of the project. Hence, the project had not been approved 
until the central leadership repressively urged the pace of negotiations. Besides, the 
adversary between the SEPA and Yunnan provincial government in the negotiation of 
NRP further indicated the segmentation of authority between organs also mentioned in 
the chapter 4. These cases are typical illustrations of showing the leverage of kuai 
relationship for successful policy formulation. Through the dimension of bargaining 
triangle, the rationales and considerations behind the stances of different actors were 
generalized and the FA model has been further enriched and amended. Despite the rapid 
economic and social change in China since economic reforms, the FA model retained its 
high explicability and applicability for the status quos in China. 
 Mertha added notions to explain the dynamic and strategies of political changes; 
the FA model‘s explanation is not as yet complete. However, his contribution is unlikely 
to explain the rationales of decision and coalitions, so his addition was criticized to be 
‗over-strategic‘ and too optimistic, in merely elaborating on how an emergent civil 
society would be more likely to oppose the authorities. Subsequently, this thesis would 
like to contribute to this area by demonstrating the transformation of initiatives and 
frustration in the policy-making processes of these two specific projects. Through 
investigating the rationales of transformation from a multi-perspective approach, more 
covered flaws in the bureaucratic systems were disclosed in the analyses. All of these 
flaws may somehow influence the policy implementation, and even the legitimacy, of 
the CCP. More importantly, these findings were able to be applied to various aspects of 
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public policies in China. Thus, more research should be conducted in the future in order 
to further extend the explicability of the model. However, rather than illustrating the 
circumstances of a specific point in the timeline of Chinese political development, this 
thesis aimed to deduce from these circumstances the capabilities of the party and 
distribution of power in decision making processes since the economic reforms. It might 
be argued that the representativeness seems to be constrained because merely using the 
illustration of hydropower development. Thus, the arguments and implications might 
thereby be limited. Yet, this thesis has contributed to the enrichment of our study of the 
transformation of the political contexts that different players encountered, so as to reveal 
the responsiveness of players for the continuous transformation of political contexts in 
China.  
Further Discussion: Empirical Implications for Chinese Hydroelectricity and 
Institutional Development 
 Findings from the multi-perspective research in this thesis should not be 
constrained to reflecting the Chinese political system. They could have further 
implications for the institutional development in China, so as to anticipate the prospects 
of the Chinese political system. Beyond the institutional aspect, the research findings 
could also provide a foundation to discuss hydroelectricity, or even environmental issues, 
in China.  
Clashes of Interests  
 In the political sense, this thesis contributed to reveal cleavages of interests 
amongst critical actors of the political system in China. Initially, the party leadership 
would like to separate economic reform from political ones. The state attempted to adopt 
a market mechanism to allow the emergence of private ownership in the Chinese 
socialist economy; the political transition to liberal democracy, on the contrary, seemed 
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to be limited. This may be due to the fear of chaos and catastrophes in pluralist society. 
Hence, the CCP would be prevented from becoming democratized and remain in the 
form of consultative authoritarianism
301
. Nevertheless, this research disclosed a number 
of cleavages amongst important actors in the decision making process. Interest 
fragmentation did not only exist inside the bureaucratic system, but latent cleavages 
were also discovered between society and the authorities. As a consequence, the party 
authorities‘ role of ‗representing local interests‘ and ‗representing the fundamental 
interests of the majority‘ has been more likely challenged, especially with respect to 
provincial cadres. Owing to the extensive diversity among provinces, the central 
government relied heavily on provincial leaders to reflect local interests
302
. Zeng 
Xiaowei identified that this phenomenon was more popular in the period of economic 
reform, as it was chiefly the consequence of the tendency towards recruiting native 
people to become provincial leaders in the central government. There were two 
advantages to this: (1) the native provincial leaders were equipped with rich knowledge 
and understanding of local situations, and this was favourable towards promoting 
economic growth in local initiatives; (2) Cross-provincial social mobility was more 
unlikely to be available for elite recruitment
303
. Subsequently, provincial leaders were 
regarded as the representatives of ‗local interests‘ and the most important channel of 
bridging the communication gap between localities and central government. Thus, they 
were granted greater autonomy and more substantive powers than before.  
 Nonetheless, this research discovered that the provinces‘ role of representing 
local interests may have been reduced. Provincial leaders represented the high 
motivations of economic development in the four decades of economic reforms. 
                                                             
301 He Baogang, The Democratic Implications of Civil Society in China, (U.K., Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997): 
124. 
302
 Li, 1997: 55-56. 
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Accordingly, there was a phenomenon known as ‗local developmentalism‘ which 
describes the unbalanced emphasis for economic development and industrialization of 
provincial leaders, as well as their entrepreneurial metaphors for local economies. Thus, 
dam construction projects were highly favored by leaders. However, rapid economic 
improvements in previous decades encouraged environmental awareness amongst the 
central government and ordinary people
304
. As a result, the political agenda between 
provincial leaders and the central government, as well as ordinary people, seemed to 
diverge. This flaw was more likely to enlarge due to the direct correlation between local 
economic improvement and leaders‘ career promotion. Further, this finding could also 
explain why provincial governments and leaders frequently become the target of large-
scale protests and civilian criticisms, rather than officials in central government.  
Implication for Development of Chinese ENGOs  
 In chapter 5, the Chinese ENGOs were selected for close investigation and it was 
concluded that the Chinese ENGOs, different from their Eastern European counterparts, 
were unlikely to significantly challenge the authorities. Thus, they were unable to fulfill 
their political functions. Nevertheless, the success of the anti-dam campaign, which was 
mainly composed by ENGOs, international NGOs and the mass media, was highlighted 
when the NRP was discussed. Therefore, how could these ENGOs expand their political 
sphere beyond informal coalitions? And, how did these ENGOs maintain their 
cohesiveness with their media allies and international counterparts? Hence, the 
emergence of NGOs in China most probably enabled the ‗import (of) varied social 
interests into the state and, of course, the Party
305‘. Yet, to what extent would the CCP 
tolerate the NGOs‘ participation? These questions should be further studied as they may 
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fundamentally transform the political landscape in China. In the aspect of 
hydroelectricity development, Chinese ENGOs are another cluster of players in the 
decision making process, and their opposition has transformed the strategy of 
development. Thus, instead of constructing gigantic multi-functional dams in the river, 
Chinese authorities would like to construct a lot of smaller dams for developing 
electricity
306
. Subsequently, it is unlikely that the Chinese authorities will reduce the 
determination of hydroelectricity development. Nevertheless, environmental activists 
may probably reduce the development speed of hydropower and pressure the authorities 
to stop constructing gigantic dam projects, such as TGP and NRP
307
. 
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